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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
Voluminous studies of performance-based compensation for teachers have been 
conducted to ascertain the dynamics of programs that are successful in improving 
teacher effectiveness and in turn student achievement. Few studies have concentrated on 
what the perceptions of teachers are on performance-based compensation models and 
what they consider fair and equitable components and structures of such models.  
 This study surveyed four school districts that had the Teacher Advancement 
Program (TAP) model and four school districts that did not have a performance pay 
model associated with their school districts. The research questions that guided the study 
were: “How do teachers in TAP school districts perceive the performance pay 
components of TAP?” and “How do teachers in non-performance pay schools perceive 
performance pay program components?” and finally, “How do these two groups of 
teachers’ perceptions compare to one another about performance pay models?”  
 Comparing the findings from the data analysis, both the TAP and non-TAP 
districts agreed that performance pay components might cause resentment among staff 
members, undermine staff morale, and create an atmosphere where teachers would be 
less willing to assist colleagues.  
Focus group interviews were conducted at three campuses from a TAP school 
district to gain in-depth insight on how teachers really perceived the components of the 
specific program implementation in their school district. Four themes emerged from the 
data analysis of the focus group interviews: (a) transparency and communication of 
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procedures, (b) reliability of observations and evaluations of teachers, (c) additional 
workload for teachers not worth the extra pay, and (d) increased professional 
development worthwhile.  
 While studies show that implementation of the TAP program with fidelity has 
increased student achievement based on test scores, the results of this study suggested 
that performance pay components within the surveyed schools was not a favorable way 
of increasing teacher pay. Future research should include compensation models that can 
be constructed without using test scores as a major component and increasing the 
amount of teacher input to construct the program.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Mrs. Pritchard (a pseudonym) surveys her fifth grade classroom of 23 students 
and begins her reading lesson as she has done since September. Now that it is April, she 
has 10 days to review and get her students ready for the State of Texas Assessment of 
Academic Readiness or STAAR exam. Has she been thinking about how her students 
will do on the STAAR test in terms of how it will affect her bonus pay next November? 
Does she, in fact, really understand how the calculations are even made for her score on 
the printouts that come from some unknown secretive company in another state?  
Mrs. Pritchard tells me that the almost $1,500 she gets around Christmas is great, 
but it is not what motivated her to become a teacher and it certainly does not induce her 
to work harder. She already puts in countless hours a week and on weekends for her 
kids, and her main objective is to get little Jamisyn and Hutton along with the rest of her 
class to pass the test so they can move on to the sixth grade. Mrs. Pritchard’s and many 
other stories are part of the growing trend toward paying teachers on how well their 
students perform on state assessments.  
Performance pay for teachers, also referred to as merit or incentive pay, usually 
based on student tests scores, has been gaining momentum since the inception of No 
Child Left Behind (NCLB) 2002 legislation and new state accountability systems 
derived from Texas and sponsored by President George Bush (U.S. Department of 
Education, 2012). Educational reformers have promoted a myriad of reasons for the 
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movement. Advocates of the movement believe that paying teachers for student 
achievement will increase student success, improve teacher motivation and reward 
exceptional teaching. While detractors warn of unhealthy competiveness, disagreement 
on school goals, excessive budgets, and even cheating (Chamberlin, Wragg, Haynes, & 
Wragg, 2002), a large amount of literature has been compiled on teacher pay scales and 
performance-based compensation that spans hundreds of years as depicted in Chapter II.  
Background 
 
Littleton Independent School District (pseudonym) has had a performance-pay 
program associated with the Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) grant program for the past 6 
years using the Teacher Advancement Program (TAP). The goal of the TAP program is 
to improve the quality of teaching in the profession and in turn improve student 
achievement, stating excellent teachers enhance student-learning (Solomon, 2005).  
School district performance-based compensation plans in TAP include an 
incentive pay portion for teachers who teach STAAR-tested subjects of math and 
reading in grades 4 through 8 and in high school, the End-of-Course exams for English I, 
English II, Biology, U.S. History, and Algebra I teachers. The performance pay dollars 
for the STAAR-tested subject instructors are based on teacher evaluation, 50%, and 
value-added growth for the students in the teacher’s classroom, 30%, and a school-wide 
score based on State assessment results, the final 20%. Not all teachers are evaluated the 
same in this system, meaning that teachers of other than STAAR-tested subjects receive 
performance pay based on 50% teacher evaluation and 50% school-wide scores. The 
school-wide score is based on the test scores that of the entire campus for reading and 
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math in grade 4 through 8 and the end-of-course exams in English I, English II, Biology, 
U.S. History, and Algebra I.  
This may become an equity issue, as teachers who do not teach the tested 
subjects may earn more performance money than the ones who actually earn the school-
wide score. The equity issue may arise based on the pools that the teachers are divided 
into by subjects taught for the performance pay portion of TAP. Teachers who teach one 
of the STAAR-tested subjects noted above are grouped in one small teacher pool. All the 
other teachers including elective teachers are grouped into another larger teacher pool. 
As the money for each teacher is put into the pool, $2,000 for teachers in most TAP 
school districts, the pool of money for the larger group of teachers is naturally larger 
than the small group of STAAR-tested subject teachers. An example may be that there 
are 10 teachers who instruct STAAR subjects for a total of $20,000 dollars and a group 
of 30 elective teachers on campus for a total of $60,000 dollars. As the teachers earn 
each portion of the performance pay, some may not earn the total $2,000, and that 
money is put back into the pool or redistributed. The result could be that one teacher 
may benefit or be given some of the redistributed funds from the underperformance of a 
colleague, and thus, a perceived inequity may surface within the payout models.  
The term free riders comes into play as elective physical education teachers may 
gain more payout dollars from the inefficiency of their colleagues but through no extra 
work of their own. As an administrator, it is very hard to explain to a fourth grade math 
teacher why a high school physical education teacher and coach may receive $2000 
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more dollars in bonus pay than she did. The amounts are intended to be confidential, but 
in small districts people talk. 
Teacher Attitudes and Motivation 
 
In reviewing the literature on teacher attitudes toward performance-based 
compensation, I found the discussion evolves into what motivates teachers. The 
consensus is that teachers do not enter into the field of education to make huge salaries, 
but money does matter to them. Kelley, Heneman, and Milanowski (2000) listed 17 
potential outcomes for teachers, one of which was salary bonuses for meeting 
performance goals. When teachers were surveyed and asked to rank the 17 indicators, 
the pay bonus was at the top of the list along with professional satisfaction of observing 
student learning. The findings indicated that teachers not only value extrinsic rewards 
but other intrinsic success as well, including professional development that improves the 
quality of their teaching toolbox (Odden, & Kelley, 1996). 
Farkas, Johnson, and Foleno (2000) created teacher focus groups and surveyed 
them on how to improve teacher quality. Educators ranked the most effective ways to 
improve quality, and smaller class size was the number one response followed by four 
other responses from 50 to 60% of the teachers. Increased salary was among the four 
other responses. As Farkas et al. (2000) suggested, higher pay for a job well done is a 
motivator for teachers as it is in any other outside industry. However, other structures 
need to be in place for teachers to support pay-for-performance schemes as they are 
called in many articles. 
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In a report from the Center for Educator Compensation Reform (CECR, 2011), 
the CECR discussed emerging issues in compensation structures and specifically details 
research on stakeholder attitudes and opinions on reward structures. The stakeholders 
include teachers, administrators, and teacher unions. The CECR indicated that 
stakeholder engagement and buy in are essential to the success of any differentiated 
compensation model.  
The American Federation of Teachers (AFT) has conveyed tentative support for 
certain types of different compensation plans in recent years. Moving beyond the 
traditional salary schedule, they have said compensation plans must include multiple 
measures of student outcomes and should reward both individual teachers and groups or 
as an entire school and would include multiple ways for teachers to earn extra incentive 
pay (AFT, 2010).  
The National Education Association (NEA) by 2008, however, had not supported 
compensation plans based on student test scores as a major component of teacher 
eligibility for monetary rewards (Flannery & Jehlen, 2008). In addition, the NEA 
cautioned that before any alternative pay system could be successful in school districts, 
there needed to be a valid, reliable, and standards-based evaluation system in place 
(Little, 2009). When these characteristics are in place, the system gives the teachers a 
perception of fairness. 
Perceived fairness of the program in addition to the values and beliefs of the 
teachers correlate with their attitudes toward any compensation plan being suggested. 
The term distributive fairness is used to describe the reasonableness of a compensation 
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plan based on the fairness of the components of the model. The components include the 
form of compensation, the dollar amount, and formula to reach the monetary reward 
distributed (Heneman, Milanowski, & Kimball, 2007). Heneman et al. (2007) suggested 
that teachers are more likely to support a program that they believe fosters change in 
behavior, but more importantly behaviors that they value. Some teachers who value 
extra effort believe that individuals that contribute more and at a higher level to the goals 
of the school should receive higher pay (Milanowski, 2007).  
The attitude of public and private school teachers and merit pay systems was the 
topic of a study by Ballou (2001). Ballou surveyed private school and public school 
teachers to gain insight into how they felt about rewards for exceptional performance. 
He used results for the SASS survey from 1987 to 1988 to compile the evidence. 
Schools with and schools without merit pay systems in place were surveyed. Notably in 
schools without merit pay systems, private school teachers strongly favored bonuses for 
exceptional performance with 41% and public schools with only 26% strongly in favor 
of bonuses. In schools with merit pay plans, private school teachers also topped the list 
with 45% in favor of the system and public school teachers 33% in favor. From the 
results, it appears that support for merit pay was greater in schools that had one in place 
and the attitudes of the private sector were very positive in schools with or without merit 
pay. Public school teacher attitudes were also slightly more positive in schools with 
merit pay plans. Compensation plans in private schools, as noted earlier, do not have to 
deal with teacher unions that can stifle attempts to install alternative compensation 
models (Ballou, 2001).  
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Regardless of the presence of unions, teachers across the nation tend to agree that 
their primary motivator is improved student achievement. Educational systems designed 
to increase student achievement will therefore also enhance teacher motivation. 
Engaging in professional development and school-wide activities are also motivators for 
teachers, as are clear goals for student achievement within the school. Along with the 
intrinsic motivators, salary and compensation are also important. The structure of the 
performance-based compensation model is the determining factor in the success of the 
program. The research is clear on poorly structured models; they do not work and are 
detrimental to the educational system (Odden & Kelley, 1996).  
New incentive pay plans are being tried around the country that will encompass 
more than a student performance measure. These plans include competitive salary levels: 
knowledge and skills-based pay and school performance awards. They should be viewed 
as a strategy to enhance student learning and advance teacher knowledge and expertise 
(Odden & Kelley, 1996).  
Performance-based compensation models should take into account what 
motivates teachers, and as the research suggests and the findings of this study did 
confirm, is that money alone does not motivate teachers to work harder. A well-
constructed plan that encompasses not only monetary incentives but also professional 
development and collaboration with colleagues is paramount if the performance pay plan 
is to achieve the intended goals of increased student achievement and high quality 
teaching in the classrooms.  
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Statement of the Problem 
 Incentive pay plans for teacher performance have been used in Texas school 
districts for several years with a variety of funding sources including the Governors 
Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG), the Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG), and 
District Awards for Teacher Excellence (DATE). Evaluation of these different grants 
used for local school district-created performance pay programs has been done by the 
National Center on Performance Incentives through Vanderbilt University with 
cooperation from the Texas Education Agency in the form of research briefs and 
working papers. The TAP program has been the subject of one of these evaluations and 
reviews the program through the lens of improving tests scores as compared to non-TAP 
schools (Springer, Ballou & Peng, 2008).  
 Surveying the perceptions and attitudes of TAP school district teachers toward 
the incentive pay component of the TAP program in Texas as compared to non-TAP 
schools without any kind of incentive pay program in place seems to be lacking in the 
research. Comparing the perceptions of the structure of a performance-based 
compensation plan of campuses with and campuses without such a plan gives insight 
into whether the program is sustainable after the grant funds have ended. If the teachers 
feel that the plan is worthwhile and equitable, then the district can make an informed 
decision to sustain the TAP model or invest in another performance-based compensation 
program.  
 Improved teacher effectiveness, increasing the amount of professional 
development, and added skills and responsibility are also part of the teacher incentive 
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pay program provided by the TAP model. In opposition to the structured TAP model, 
locally created incentive plans funded by the TEEG grant were evaluated for three 
consecutive years of implementation by Springer et al. (2007, 2008, 2009) where the 
findings suggested that the local design of the plan and the characteristics of the schools 
influenced the attitudes and behaviors of teachers, school environment, and teacher 
turnover.  
Purpose of the Study 
 The primary purpose of this study was to compare teachers’ perceptions and 
attitudes toward the performance pay components of the TAP program in four Texas 
school districts and their non-TAP counterparts in four school districts. The school 
districts were matched by using indicators including student enrollment numbers, 
number of teachers, and demographic information, including percentage of economically 
disadvantaged students enrolled at the campus. I wanted to compare the responses to 
questions about the implementation and perceived fairness of the TAP performance-
based compensation program with teachers in school districts without a performance pay 
model to determine their perceptions and attitudes if such a model were being 
contemplated by their school district. Finally, I investigated if the perceptions and 
attitudes of the teachers in TAP schools and non-TAP schools toward a performance-
based compensation program would influence their teaching practices. The data 
collected from survey instruments of both TAP and non-TAP schools and the focus 
group interviews from the TAP campuses were analyzed to provide information to be 
used by school districts in Texas to determine if the TAP program may be a viable 
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choice for a performance-based incentive program and if the campuses without a 
performance pay program would be willing to attempt such a plan in their school 
districts.  
Significance of the Study 
 
The findings of this study may provide an avenue for districts considering the 
System for Teacher and Student Advancement, formerly the Teacher Advancement 
Program (TAP) and its performance-based compensation components to thoroughly 
evaluate all aspects of the program. It may also provide school districts that are 
contemplating a performance-based compensation plan with the necessary insight 
regarding teacher’s attitudes and perceptions of performance pay models and various 
components of these types of plans going forward.  
In addition, the results should provide school leaders with the tools to effectively 
communicate to stakeholders all the inter-connecting parts of the model. Many studies 
and articles have been published regarding performance pay and teacher motivation, 
including Ballou (2001), who researched the attitudes of public and private school 
teachers and merit pay systems. A comparative multi-case study of TAP school districts 
and non-TAP school districts in Texas, including the attitudes and perceptions of the 
teachers in schools that have adopted the performance-based compensation program and 
ones that have not, has not been done.  
By conducting a comparative multi-case study, the emphasis was to determine if 
such programs were considered fair, equitable, and a viable performance-based model as 
Little (2009) suggested. It is my hope that the findings will contribute to the field of 
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research on performance pay for teachers and their attitudes of this specific program as 
compared to non-TAP schools or schools without a performance-based compensation 
plan already in place.  
Theoretical Framework 
 
 I applied the economic theory of principal-agent relationship also known as 
agency theory (Mitnick, 1973) to my study of TAP and the teachers who work within the 
guidelines of the program. First, I defined the concept of the principal-agent 
relationships, and then I outlined the similarities between the economic theory and the 
educational setting of the study. Finally, I described the pertinent principal-agent 
relationships and the dilemmas that may arise in the public school domain.  
 In defining the principal-agent theory, Delves and Patrick (2010) described the 
principal-agent relationship in the business context as when one person (the principal) 
engages another person (the agent) to perform a service on behalf of the principal. They 
explained that although the principal and the agent may be working toward the same 
goal, they may not have the same interests. The principal is trying to maximize profits 
for his own benefit by employing the agent for the least amount of salary and incentives 
to remain cost effective. The agent on the other hand, actually may have more 
information than the principal may about the work and knows how to increase 
production but may not have the same incentive to produce at a high quality level since 
they may not be included in the profit-sharing and only receive minimum payment. 
 In the education field, the principal-agent relationship may include many 
scenarios. This may include the state as the principal and the local school district as an 
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agent and the local school district as a principal and the teacher as the agent. Examples 
of principal-agent relationships for this study can be seen in Figure 1 that was adapted 
from Levacic (2009). 
 
 
 
PRINCIPAL     AGENT 
 
State      Local School District 
 
Local School Board   Central administration 
 
Central administration  Campus Principal 
 
Campus principal   Teacher 
 
Teacher    Students 
 
Figure 1. Principal-agent relationships in public education. 
 
 In her paper for the Oxford Developmental Studies, Levacic (2009) summarized 
and applied the principal agent theory to the teaching profession in Great Britain. She 
described the variables that face educators when dealing with students who may not 
present themselves in the business world. These included the student’s family 
background and preparation for schooling. Casson (2007) also elaborated on the 
variables that teachers cannot control using the term “student quality” (p. 90). He 
characterized student quality as income status, social status, and the education of the 
student’s parents. These uncontrollable variables in the teaching profession lead to the 
relationship dilemmas teachers and administrators may have when working within the 
constraints of the TAP program.  
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 Framing the principal-agent theory for the purpose of this study, I extend the 
reference to local school districts (principals) that adopted the Teacher Advancement 
Program (the contract) as the performance pay compensation model and the teachers 
(agents) they employ, working toward educating the students in the district. The goal of 
the district in adopting the TAP performance-based compensation model is to provide 
incentives for teachers to improve student achievement through additional pay for 
improving standardized tests scores, providing positive evaluation results, and increasing 
knowledge and skills in their field.  
 The TAP program itself may also be considered the contract and the school 
district the principal in the relationship as teachers, or agents, are complying with the 
principal and the guidelines of the program in order to earn the extra pay based on their 
student’s performance (see Figure 2). The principal-agent dilemma occurs when the 
performance pay of the teachers is based on the test scores of the students that the 
teachers may have limited influence on as several variables, described earlier, can affect 
the outcome of standardized tests. In addition, the school-wide score, of the TAP 
incentive plan can induce some teachers to become free riders as the scores are based on 
the STAAR results for only a limited number of teachers and all teachers benefit from 
those few.  
 
PRINCIPAL   CONTRACT  AGENT  OUTCOMES 
 
 
Local School District    TAP   Teacher Student Achievement 
Figure 2. Principal-agent relationships involving TAP. 
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Research Questions 
 
If, as the principal-agent theory suggests, the goal of the school district in using 
the TAP program or any other performance-based incentive can be viewed, according to 
Odden and Kelley (1996) as a strategy to enhance student learning and advance teacher 
knowledge and skills, the structure of the model and how teachers perceive it is 
imperative to the success of the plan. In an attempt to gather these perceptions of 
teachers in an incentive pay model (TAP) and teachers not in an incentive pay model, 
the following research questions guided my study.  
1. How do teachers in TAP school districts perceive the performance pay 
components of TAP? 
2. How do teachers in non-performance pay schools perceive performance pay 
program components? 
3. How do these two groups of teachers’ perceptions compare to one another 
about performance pay models?  
Secondary research questions developed in my study with data gathered from a 
qualitative method using focus group interviews at a TAP school included:  
4. What components of the TAP performance pay model do the teachers feel are 
beneficial? 
5. What do teachers suggest as ways to improve the TAP performance pay 
model? 
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Definition of Terms 
Throughout this study, many educational terms were used that may be foreign to 
the reader of this study, and therefore, I provide the definition and context that was used 
in the research. 
American Federation of Teachers (AFT) – The American Federation of Teachers 
(AFT, 2013), an affiliate of the AFL-CIO, was founded in 1916 and today represents 1.5 
million members in more than 3,000 local affiliates nationwide.  
National Education Association (NEA) – The National Education Association 
(NEA), the nation’s largest professional employee organization, is committed to 
advancing the cause of public education. NEA’s 3 million members work at every level 
of education—from pre-school to university graduate programs. NEA has affiliate 
organizations in every state and in more than 14,000 communities across the United 
States (NEA 2012).  
No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act – The No Child Left Behind Act is also known 
as the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 2001. George W. Bush enacted the 
act in 2001 to close the achievement gap with accountability, flexibility, and choice, so 
that no child is left behind (U.S. Department of Education, 2012).  
Performance-Based Compensation – In the context of this study, performance-
based compensation is the extra monetary payment a teacher may receive based on a set 
of standards that is created by an outside organization or an internal committee and then 
adopted by the district. It is also known as merit pay, incentive pay and performance 
pay.  
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Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) – The Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) is 
a system of related questionnaires that provide descriptive data on the context of 
elementary and secondary education and policymakers and a variety of statistics on the 
condition of education in the United States (National Center for Education Statistics, 
1988).  
State of Texas Assessment of Academic Readiness (STAAR) – The State of Texas 
Assessment of Academic Readiness is a series of state-mandated standardized tests used 
in Texas public primary and secondary schools to assess a student's achievements and 
knowledge learned in the grade level. 
Standardized Test – Any test in which the same test is given in the same manner 
to all test takers is a standardized test. 
Student Achievement – For the purpose of this study, student achievement refers 
to the students’ scores on the STAAR test in reading and math for grades 4-8 and end-
of-course exams in high school. 
Teacher – The term is used in this study to include core classroom teachers of 
STAAR-tested subjects as well as athletic coaches and elective teachers including band, 
drama, music, technology, and agriculture teachers.  
TAP – Teacher Advancement Program now known as The System for Teacher 
and Student Advancement is dedicated to attracting, developing, motivating, and 
retaining high-quality human capital in order to raise achievement levels for all students. 
Launched in 1999 by education pioneer Lowell Milken and colleagues at the Milken 
Family Foundation, TAP restructures and revitalizes the teaching profession by 
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providing teachers with powerful opportunities for career advancement, ongoing 
professional development, a fair evaluation system, and performance-based 
compensation (National Institute of Excellence in Teaching [NIET, 2013]).  
TIF – The Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) was established to encourage states and 
districts to develop comprehensive programs that include other elements, in addition to 
performance pay, that have been shown to increase student achievement and teacher skill 
levels. Specifically, the federal program encourages grantees to include (a) multiple 
measures of teacher performance, such as multiple classroom evaluations and measures 
of student academic growth over time; (b) additional compensation for teachers who 
take on additional roles or responsibilities; (c) a financial commitment from states and 
districts; and (d) support from a majority of teachers at the schools (TIF, 2012).  
Limitations 
 
The research study had the following limitations; 
1. The focus of the study was the TAP program on campuses in four school 
districts in Texas as compared to non-TAP campuses in four school districts 
also in Texas and the results may not be generalizable to other school districts 
with different performance pay plans across Texas or in other states. 
2. The accuracy and candidness of the data collected from the participating 
school district during focus group interviews were beyond the control of the 
researcher. 
3. The focus groups were conducted in one TAP school district with participants 
from grade spans of elementary school (grades K-5), middle school (grades 6-
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8) and high school (grades 9-12). Their response may not be generalizable to 
other TAP schools that may implement the program differently. 
4. Several TAP School districts chose not to participate.  
Delimitations 
 
The study was bounded by surveying school districts in Texas that used a 
specific performance pay program, specifically the Teacher Advancement Program and 
the perceptions and opinions of teachers who do not teach in a TAP district. This limited 
the study to the performance pay components of the TAP program used to incentivize 
teacher performance. Other performance pay programs were not be included in the 
study. 
Assumptions 
 
The assumptions included in this study of the perceptions and attitudes of 
teachers toward performance pay components were that the teachers were sent the links 
to the survey by the district liaisons and that the teachers accurately responded to the 
survey questions provided. I also assumed that the focus group participants spoke 
truthfully and without fear of retaliation.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Introduction 
Performance pay for teachers, also referred to as merit or incentive pay, usually 
based on student tests scores on standardized tests, has been gaining momentum since 
the inception of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) 2002 legislation and new state 
accountability systems sponsored by President George Bush. Educational reformers have 
fostered a myriad of reasons for the movement (U.S. Department of Education, 2012). 
Advocates of the movement believe that paying teachers for student achievement will 
increase student success, improve teacher motivation, and reward exceptional teaching, 
while detractors warn of unhealthy competiveness, disagreement on school goals, 
excessive budgets, and even cheating (Chamberlin et al., 2002). A large amount of 
literature has been compiled on teacher pay scales and performance-based compensation 
that spans hundreds of years. A summary of this literature is included in Table 1. 
In Chapter II, I develop a systematic review as described by Randolph (2009) of 
the pertinent literature for my study, the Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) and its 
performance-based compensation component that rewards teachers with additional pay 
for the performance of their students on a standardized test in Texas, the STAAR. I 
began by defining the purpose of my study guided by the following research questions: 
1. How do teachers in TAP school districts perceive the performance pay 
components of TAP? 
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Table 1. Summary of Findings from Literature Reviewed 
Literature        Summary 
American Federation of 
Teachers (2010) 
Compensation plans must include multiple measures of student 
outcome. It should reward both individual and groups or the entire 
school. Also include multiple ways for teachers to earn incentive 
pay. 
 
Ballou (2001)  Little evidence can be cited for skills and knowledge of teachers to 
support student achievement. More teachers in favor of merit pay 
plans that already exist in their schools. 
 
Ballou & Prodgursky (1997) Although religious schools have an easier time implementing merit 
pay systems, many avoid them as they may appear contrary to 
ethical beliefs of the school. 
 
Bourne & MacArthur (1970) Two forms of performance pay traced back to Great Britain in 1860, 
knowledge and skills-based pay, also known as “notorious payment 
for results.” Created cheating and teaching to the test.  
  
Brandt (1995) Tennessee program most comprehensive of its kind using summative 
evaluations, ongoing professional development and mentoring for 
monetary rewards for teachers.  
 
Center for Educator 
Compensation Reform  
CECR (2011) 
Most models use individual or group monetary rewards or a hybrid 
that includes both. Stakeholder buy in is essential in any 
differentiated compensation model. 
 
Chamberlin, Wragg, Haynes, & 
Wragg (2002) 
Pay used to reward employees in five ways: piecework, equity, profit 
sharing, one off bonus, and merit or performance pay. 
 
Dee & Keys (2004) Evaluated Tennessee Career Ladder Evaluation System. Made 
significant improvements in math but not reading.  
 
Denver Public Schools (1999) 
ProComp System  
Four components to program: knowledge and skills acquisition, 
evaluations, market incentives, and student growth on state tests. 
 
Eberts, Hollenbeck, & Stone 
(2002) 
Michigan pilot merit pay program was two steps: teachers to keep 
students in class and students evaluated teachers. Unintended results 
may occur. 
 
Farkas, Johnson, & Foleno 
(2000) 
Created teacher focus groups and asked most effective way to 
improve quality in education. Smaller class sizes were number one 
and increased salary was agreed upon by 50% to 60% of teachers.  
 
Goldin (2003) Grade-based compensation model description. 
 
Guthrie, Springer, Rolle, & 
Houck (2007) 
Secondary teachers in 1900s paid more than elementary.  
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Table 1 (Continued)  
Literature Summary 
Kelly, Heneman, & Milanowski 
(2000) 
Teachers do not enter field to make large salaries, but money does 
matter. Bonus pay was near the top of 17 ranked survey indicators. 
 
Murnane & Cohen (1986)  
 
Described many other goals schools strive for besides test scores. 
National Institute of Excellence 
in Teaching (NIET, 2012) 
 
Description of four elements of program. 
 
Odden & Conley (1992) Constructing a performance pay program agreeable to all parties and 
sustainable over time is a big challenge.  
 
Odden & Kelley (1996) Poorly structured performance pay plans do not work. Primary 
teacher motivator is improved student achievement. 
 
Odden & Kelley (2002) Previous merit pay schemes failed outright or are not sustainable 
over time. 
 
Podgursky & Springer (2007a)  Single salary schedule or step system created in 1900s. Inequities in 
1900s of grade based pay. White males had more access to 
secondary jobs.  
 
Prostik (1996) History of teacher compensation room and board model. 
 
Sharpes (1987) By 1950, 97% of all schools had salary step system. 
 
Solomon (2005) TAP program proposed to improve teaching practices and in turn 
enhance student learning. 
 
Vanderbilt University (2015), 
National Center on Performance 
Incentives 
Compiles research and tracks progress on national performance pay 
experiments. 
 
 
2. How do teachers in non-performance pay schools perceive performance pay 
program components? 
3. How do these two groups of teachers’ perceptions compare to one another 
about performance pay models?  
Secondary research questions developed in my study with data gathered from a 
qualitative method using focus group interviews at a TAP school included:  
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4. What components of the TAP performance pay model do the teachers feel are 
beneficial? 
5. What do teachers suggest as ways to improve the TAP performance pay 
model? 
Next, I searched online databases including ERIC, Academic Search Complete, 
EBSCO, and Proquest for journal articles, theses, and dissertations with similar search 
terms, followed by selecting the most pertinent articles and studies from the United 
States that meet the criteria of my topic, performance pay or merit pay programs and 
teacher attitudes toward those schemes. Finally, I analyzed and synthesized the material 
into a cohesive review that follows my purpose of the study.  
In my review of the literature, I reviewed the history of the TAP program model 
and its performance-based compensation component for teachers. I also investigated the 
history of performance-based compensation models and transition into the ones currently 
being used in the schools of the United States including comparing the structure and 
components of these models. 
 The next phase of the literature review included reviewing research on teacher 
attitudes and perceptions toward performance-based compensation models. Also 
included were studies dealing with student achievement and the latest information 
available on value added calculations and student progress. 
Chapter II is divided into the following sections, (a) the history and components 
of the TAP program, (b) the brief history of performance-based compensation models, 
(c) current performance-based compensation models, (d) research on teacher attitudes 
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and perceptions of performance-based compensation models, (e) student achievement, 
including value add scores and standardized test scores.  
Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) 
 
While researching performance-based compensation models, several merit pay 
models will be discussed, including the TAP program that has gained notoriety over the 
past 15 years since it was developed. The Teacher Advancement Program now called 
The System for Teacher and Student Advancement and was created in 1999 by Lowell 
Milken and his colleagues at the Milken Foundation and implemented in schools in the 
2000-2001 school year (NIET, 2013). Lowell Milken is a businessman, real estate 
developer, and philanthropist and has co-founded Knowledge Universe, the largest 
provider of early childhood education in the world. The program description from the 
organization’s website (NIET, 2015) describes it as an educational reform that 
revitalizes and restructures the teaching profession and is comprised of four components 
that include 
1. Multiple career paths for educators, including different levels that teachers 
may aspire to and earn extra stipends for an increased amount of responsibility. These 
levels are the regular classroom or career teacher, the next level upward is the mentor 
teacher who also has a class of students but receives an additional stipend to be an 
evaluator of peers and assist in leading professional development. The highest level for a 
teacher in a TAP campus is called the master teacher. These educators are given a 
sizeable stipend, do not have a classroom of students, and are also trained in the 
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evaluation process based on the instructional rubric included in the program. The master 
teachers lead the professional learning community meetings called cluster meetings.  
2. Ongoing applied professional growth is the emphasis of the above-mentioned 
cluster meetings. This meeting time is built into the school day for all teachers to 
collaborate and acquire new skills and strategies presented by the master and mentor 
teachers. The time is very structured and must follow the protocol that is designated by 
the program.  
3. Instructionally focused accountability is the third component and the way the 
teachers at the TAP campuses are evaluated. Each teacher is observed at least three times 
per year by the master, mentor, or an administrator and includes a preconference and a 
post conference to discuss strengths and weaknesses noted during the observations.  
4. Performance-based compensation is the financial equivalent to merit pay 
based on several components that is tied to the teacher’s performance throughout the 
school year. The educator receives extra bonus money based on evaluation results, 
student performance on standardized assessments, and responsibilities that are noted in 
the rubric called an SKR score that is skills, knowledge, and responsibility.  
 I surveyed the subjects of my study to determine their perceptions and attitudes 
toward the above-mentioned components of TAP in place in their respective school 
districts.  
A Brief History of Teacher Compensation 
 
Teacher compensation can be traced to the one-room schoolhouse that was born 
out of the increased transportation system of rural areas in the early nineteenth century. 
 25 
Almost 80% of people lived in the rural communities and half of them were farmers 
(Protsik, 1996). Teachers received room and board for their services to the local 
community; hence, the room and board compensation model was created. They moved 
from home-to-home of the families they served (Prostik, 1996).  
As the industrial age approached, more and more students required schooling and 
the one-room schoolhouse was not sufficient and the demand for teachers rose. This new 
era ushered in the grade-based compensation model for teacher compensation in the late 
1800s. As Goldin (2003) described “the new economy involved a greater use of science 
by industry, a proliferation of academic discipline, a series of critical inventions and 
their diffusion” (p. 75). The compensation model rewarded secondary school teachers 
with higher salaries than elementary teachers.  
At the time, it was believed that the skills needed to instruct older students 
required advanced levels of knowledge and elementary age students were easier to 
educate (Guthrie et al., 2007). The grade-based model created a standard to pay teachers 
in a constant manner by grade, but it lead to inequities of compensation resulting not 
only in nepotism, but also in inequalities based on gender and race as White males had 
unequal access to secondary positions (Podgursky & Springer, 2007a).  
The grade-based compensation model for teachers gave way to the single salary 
schedule in the early twentieth century. The single salary or position-automatic schedule, 
as it was originally called, created the step system that is primarily used today. The step 
system for paying teachers compensates teachers the same salary with similar years’ 
experience and educational level (Podgursky & Springer, 2007b). Since the step system 
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came into existence, it has been the primary model used by districts across the nation. By 
1950, 97% of all schools had adopted the single salary schedule or step system (Sharpes, 
1987). Currently, an estimated 96% of all public school districts use a similar 
compensation schedule to pay its teachers (Podgursky & Springer, 2007b). As 
educational reformers react to lower worldwide test scores on math and science for U.S. 
students as compared to other countries, some current step system salary scales are being 
shelved for experimental compensation models, compensation models based more on 
performance outcomes that use student test scores as the measuring stick.  
Merit-based pay or knowledge and skill-based pay are two forms of 
performance-based compensation that can be traced back to Great Britain in the 1860s. 
During this period, the evaluation and position of each teacher was based on the results 
of an examination taken by their students, also referred to as the “notorious payment for 
results” system in Britain and lasted almost 30 years (Bourne & MacArthur, 1970, p. 
20). The system created cheating and teaching to the test or examination. The system 
also ignored the high students and concentrated resources on lower level students or the 
bubble kids as we call them today (Bourne & MacArthur, 1970).  
Knowledge and skill-based compensation is a system where teachers are 
rewarded for gaining additional knowledge in their field or subject matter. The 
compensation is more about the input for the teacher than the output of the students 
(Odden & Kelley, 1996). Although the knowledge the teachers gain may help in 
classroom management, curriculum awareness, and content knowledge, little evidence 
can be cited to support student achievement in this system (Ballou, 2001; Ballou & 
 27 
Podgursky, 2001; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2004). Results or output-oriented compensation 
has been and continues to be the basis of salary schedules in the private sector.  
Payment for results is described by Chamberlin et al. (2002) as pay that can be 
used to reward employees in five ways. These include piecework, equity, and profit 
sharing that are not applicable to the teaching profession, a fourth is called one-off 
bonuses that occur when a project is completed or in recognition for an award that is 
very seldom used in education. The fifth option is merit or performance related pay that 
is added to a teacher’s salary and is counted for pension purposes.  
In reviewing the literature, I discovered that this type of pay for performance 
compensation is being tested throughout the nation in response to educational reformers 
calling for improvements in our educational system. As the interest grows in 
performance-based pay for public education, several organizations have begun to 
compile research and track progress of current experiments across the nation. The most 
notable in this field are: (a) The Center for Education Compensation Reform, (b) 
Vanderbilt University’s (2015) Peabody College’s the National Center on Performance 
Incentives, and (c) the Education Commission of the States (Podgursky & Springer, 
2007a). 
Current Performance-Based Compensation Models 
Innovative and bold performance pay model proposals are growing throughout 
the nation in response to educational reformers bellowing for higher educational 
standards for students and communities wanting better schools for their children. There 
has not been such an outcry for reform for the teacher salary system since the early 
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1990s. Previously, all movements to change teachers’ pay to depend on other factors 
including student performance, have failed outright or have not been sustainable over 
long periods of time (Odden & Kelley, 2002).  
In this section, a review of some of the latest attempts to improve education by 
creating a performance-based compensation model for the teachers who work in the 
public school districts across our nation will be explored. Compensation for educators 
includes both salary and benefits, but many researchers include the terms teacher pay, 
teacher salary, and compensation interchangeably as meaning a benefit package. The 
challenge is constructing a teacher benefit package based on performance that is 
agreeable to all parties and can be financed and sustained for more than a few years 
(Odden & Conley 1992).  
Teacher performance-based compensation models use a variety of structures and 
qualifications for the educator to earn more money in addition to their base salary. The 
basic structures of most are individual or group monetary rewards or a hybrid program 
that includes both types of awards (CECR, 2011). Most use a combination of teacher 
evaluations by administrators and student performance on a standardized assessment and 
professional development attainment as qualifications to earn awards. What follows are 
several descriptions of programs that have been attempted in the United States. 
The Denver Public School’s Professional Compensation System for Teachers 
known as ProComp began in 1999. According to the Denver Public Schools website, this 
model has four components that teachers may use to increase their salary. These include 
knowledge and skills that pay for professional development and advanced degrees and 
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includes tuition and student loan reimbursement. The comprehensive professional 
evaluation component is based on satisfactory performance evaluations. Market 
incentives are a third component that rewards teachers in hard-to-serve or staff schools 
in the district. The student growth measure of the system rewards teachers for advancing 
student achievement on the state-standardized test, CSAP.  
Funding for the Denver compensation model was provided by an additional $25 
million in taxes as voted on by the taxpayers and $22.67 million in federal money in the 
form of a five-year Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) grant from the U.S. Department of 
Education (Podgursky & Springer, 2007a). President George W. Bush initiated the 
Teacher Incentive Fund program in 2004. The stated goals of the TIF grants were to 
“develop and implement performance based teacher and principal compensation systems 
in high need, disadvantaged schools” (Bush, 2004, para. 3).  
A TIF grant along with other district funding sources have also been used to fund 
other performance pay models including the Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) 
proposed in 1999 by the Milken Family foundation out of Santa Monica, California  
(Podgursky & Springer, 2007a). The goal of the TAP program is to improve the quality 
of teaching in the profession and in turn improve student achievement, stating excellent 
teachers enhance student learning (Solomon, 2005).  
One interesting experiment with performance pay was conducted in Michigan in 
1996 as a pilot program. The school was an alternative campus with approximately 500 
students who were seeking high school diplomas. The alternative campus staff was given 
the opportunity to participate in a two-step incentive plan. Step 1 was retention of 
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students in the class and step 2 was a student evaluation of the teacher in the classroom 
(Eberts, Hollenbeck, & Stone, 2002). Retention in the class was whether the student was 
in attendance when the principal walked through and did a spot check count of the 
number of students in the teacher’s classroom as compared to the beginning of the 
grading period. The teacher evaluation was similar to a college professor evaluation, 
rating the teacher effectiveness and the class content to determine the size of the 
incentive the teacher earned.  
The average merit pay for the teachers in this pilot was approximately $5,000. 
Results of the study concluded that pay for performance can motivate teachers to 
produce outcomes that are directly rewarded. It also suggested that complex 
organizations such as schools that have multiple daily tasks and stakeholders along with 
a team approach may produce unintended results as well unless the plan is carefully 
constructed and implemented (Eberts et al., 2002). Unintended results are the main 
reason many of the models fail. One such result is that the plan does not reward the most 
effective teachers but rather all teachers in a group.  
Dee and Keys (2004) examined data from the Tennessee Career Ladder 
Evaluation System and the Project Star class-size experiment. The teachers and students 
were selected at random so as not to have any bias in the results. The researchers in this 
case compared career ladder teachers, those who received merit pay and the students 
they served with non-career ladder teachers, ones who did not receive merit pay to 
observe any significant difference in student achievement. Their results showed a 
significant 3% gain in math with students who had teachers on the career ladder as 
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compared to those that did not. However, there was no significant difference in reading 
scores. 
Effectiveness of a good teacher, Dee and Keys (2004) argued, is very hard to 
evaluate and the “evaluation problem” in schools is compounded by the fact that there 
are so many variables and goals in schools other than simply student achievement (p. 
472). Socialization skills, promoting good citizenship, encouraging differentiated 
thinking are examples of goals that schools strive for (Murnane & Cohen, 1986). The 
pessimism of merit pay systems often hinges on what makes an effective teacher and 
how they are evaluated. In the study of the Tennessee Career Ladder Evaluation System, 
Malo and French (1987) found that it used more than one method to reward teachers. 
Praise for the components of the system has come from outside observers. Brandt (1995) 
stated that the Tennessee program is “perhaps the country’s most comprehensive 
experiment in summative evaluation” (p. 475). The system includes ongoing 
professional development rewards as well as monetary rewards for taking on more 
responsibilities, as mentoring new staff members.  
The system combines five stages or rungs on the career ladder including 
probation, apprentice, Level I, Level II, and Level III. Under this system, teachers must 
apply and be evaluated for each level of the system to be rewarded with an additional 
salary stipend. Evaluations at each stage of the career ladder assess teachers on multiple 
domains and indicators using distinct district guidelines (Furtwengler, 1985). Once the 
teacher earns the stipends, they can range from an additional $1,000 to as much as 
$7,000 for the top level. Evaluating teacher effectiveness in the way the Tennessee 
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system does, by adding more requirements for teachers to meet to be rewarded, seems to 
be one of the more popular models for performance-based compensation. In the previous 
section of the paper, I looked at several different performance-based compensation 
programs throughout the nation that have been attempted. 
Private school versus public school merit pay is another topic that falls in the 
realm of incentive pay. The literature on the use of merit pay in private schools, 
specifically, Ballou (2001) suggested the overwhelming reason that merit pay fails in 
public schools are teacher unions. The private school sector, with the exception of some 
of the large Catholic dioceses, does not contend with teacher unions. This gives the 
private schools more flexibility in contract renewals, salary schedules, and teacher 
certifications when negotiating incentives with their teachers. Many private schools can 
make awards or incentives available in a quiet, non-public manner and do not have to 
deal with unions representing unsatisfied employees. With the absence of teacher unions, 
educator contracts at the private institutions can be dissolved at the end of the school 
year as warranted by poor performance. Teachers who complain in a private school 
about salary differentiations in a merit pay system could be deemed as non-team players 
who put personal gain before the school (Ballou, 2001). The possibility of contract non-
renewal in private schools stifles their outcry that their public school counterparts with 
union backing can pursue. In the public schools, many teachers are on term contracts 
and, therefore, are more difficult to terminate even if they do not perform well in the 
merit pay system. The influence of teacher unions has led to many performance-based 
compensation plans being undermined.  
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Several factors contribute to the reasons more private schools do not use a merit 
pay system as described by Ballou (2001). Particularly, the private sector is much 
smaller than the public schools and professional norms established in the public schools 
are adopted by the private schools. Many religious schools avoid the merit pay systems 
as they feel it runs contrary to their ethical values in promoting a Christian learning 
environment (Ballou & Podgursky, 1997). Private schools have also embraced the salary 
schedules of public schools to avoid discriminatory issues that would have legal 
consequences. Consequently, private schools are wary of attempting any incentive pay 
systems that their public school counterparts do not approve. Teacher attitudes toward 
incentive pay in both private and public schools is a continuing topic of discussion 
among educators. In the next section, literature regarding teacher attitudes and what 
motivates faculty toward incentives will be discussed. 
Teacher Attitudes and Motivation Related to Performance-Based Compensations 
 
A review of the literature on teacher attitudes toward performance-based 
compensation evolved into what motivates teachers. The consensus was that teachers do 
not enter into the field of education to make huge salaries, but money does matter to 
them. The Consortium for Policy Research in Education, in a report by Kelley et al. 
(2000), listed 17 potential outcomes for teachers related to performance-based 
compensation – one of which was – salary bonuses for meeting performance goals. 
When teachers were surveyed and asked to rank the 17 indicators, the bonus pay was at 
the top of the list along with professional satisfaction of observing student learning. The 
findings showed that teachers not only value extrinsic rewards but other intrinsic success 
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as well, including professional development that improves the quality of their teaching 
toolbox (Odden & Kelley, 1996). 
Farkas et al. (2000) created teacher focus groups and surveyed them on how to 
improve teacher quality. The educators were asked to rank the most effective ways to 
improve quality and smaller class size was the number one response followed by four 
other responses from 50 to 60% of the teachers. Increased salary was among the four 
responses. The Farkas et al. study suggested higher pay for a job well done is a 
motivator for teachers as it is in any other outside industry. However, other structures 
need to be in place for teachers to support pay for performance schemes as they are 
called in many articles. 
In a report from the Center for Educator Compensation Reform (CECR, 2011), 
the CECR discussed emerging issues in compensation structures and specifically details 
research on stakeholder attitudes and opinions on reward structures. The stakeholders 
included teachers, administrators, and teacher unions. The CECR stated that stakeholder 
engagement and buy in are essential to the success of any differentiated compensation 
model.  
The two major national teachers unions, the American Federation of Teachers 
(AFT) and the National Education Association (NEA) have conveyed tentative support 
for certain types of different compensation plans in recent years. The AFT (2013) 
actually offered a resolution on professional compensation for teachers who move 
beyond the rigid hierarchy of the traditional salary scales. Moving beyond the traditional 
salary schedule, the teachers say that compensation plans must include multiple 
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measures of student outcomes and should reward both individual teachers and groups or 
as an entire school and would include multiple ways for teachers to earn extra incentive 
pay (AFT, 2013).  
The NEA has not supported compensation plans based on student test scores as a 
major component of teacher eligibility for monetary rewards (Flannery & Jehlen, 2008). 
In addition, the NEA cautioned school districts that before any alternative pay system 
can be successful, there needs to be a valid, reliable, and standards-based evaluation 
system in place (Little, 2009). When these characteristics are in place, the system gives 
teachers a perception of fairness. 
Perceived fairness of the program in addition to the values and beliefs of the 
teachers correlate with their attitudes toward any compensation plan being suggested. 
The term, distributive fairness, is used to describe the reasonableness of a compensation 
plan based on the fairness of the components of the model. The components include the 
form of compensation, the dollar amount, and formula to reach the monetary reward 
distributed (Heneman et al., 2007). Heneman et al. (2007) also suggested that teachers 
are more likely to support a program that they believe fosters change in behavior but 
more importantly behaviors that they value. Some teachers who value extra effort 
believe that individuals who contribute more and at a higher level to the goals of the 
school should receive higher pay (Milanowski, 2007).  
The attitude of public and private school teachers and merit pay systems was the 
topic of a study by Ballou (2001). The author surveyed private school and public school 
teachers to gain insight into how they felt about rewards for exceptional performance. 
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The study used results for the SASS survey from 1987-1988 to compile the evidence. 
Schools with and schools without merit pay systems in place were surveyed. Notably in 
schools without merit pay systems, private school teachers strongly favored bonuses for 
exceptional performance with 41% and public schools with only 26% strongly in favor 
of bonuses. In schools with merit pay plans, private school teachers also topped the list 
with 45% in favor of the system and public school teachers 33% in favor. From the 
results, it appears that support for merit pay was greater in schools that had one in place 
and the attitudes of the private sector were very positive in schools with or without merit 
pay. Public school teacher attitudes were also slightly more positive in schools with 
merit pay plans. Compensation plans in private schools, as noted earlier, do not have to 
deal with teacher unions that can stifle attempts to install alternative compensation 
models (Ballou, 2001).  
Regardless of the presence of unions, teachers across the nation agree their 
primary motivator is improved student achievement. Educational systems designed to 
increase student achievement also enhance teacher motivation. Engaging in professional 
development and school-wide activities are also motivators for teachers as are clear 
goals for student achievement within the school. Along with the intrinsic motivators, 
salary and compensation are also important. The structure of the performance-based 
compensation model is the determining factor in the success of the program. The 
research is clear on poorly structured models; such models do not work and are 
detrimental to the educational system (Odden & Kelley, 1996).  
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New incentive pay plans are being implemented around the country that will 
encompass more than a student performance measure. These plans include competitive 
salary levels, knowledge and skills-based pay, and school performance awards. They 
should be viewed as a strategy to enhance student learning and advance teacher 
knowledge and expertise (Odden & Kelley, 1996).  
Performance-based compensation models should take into account what 
motivates teachers and as the researchers have suggested, money alone does not 
motivate teachers to work harder. A well-constructed plan that encompasses not only 
monetary incentives but also professional development and collaboration with 
colleagues is paramount if the performance pay plan is to achieve the intended goals of 
increased student achievement and high quality teaching in the classrooms.  
Summary 
 
 The topic of performance-based compensation, merit pay, or incentive pay for 
teachers is well researched and continues to be a pivotal issue in the educational reform 
movement. In this literature, I reviewed and discussed the inception of teacher 
compensation that began as room and board in exchange for teaching in rural areas to the 
introduction of the salary step schedule at the beginning of the industrial age where 
salary schedules were developed to reward teachers on years of experience regardless of 
performance in the classroom. Performance compensation models were patterned after 
industry, but the teaching profession has so many variables that cannot be measured by 
piecework so other models were developed.  
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 The other models included multiple requirements or opportunities for teachers to 
earn extra pay. Districts are experimenting with professional development, knowledge 
and skills attainment, student achievement, and extra duties and activities. Compensation 
models are funded through various sources including taxpayer dollars and federal grants 
such as the TIF grant, state grants, and local school district budgets. Sustainability of the 
compensation models often was determined by the amount of funding and the years 
available to the school districts.  
 Merit pay systems in private schools versus public schools have been studied, 
and it was mentioned that the lack of union presences in the private sector makes 
compensation models more attractive to private schools. However, many private schools 
use similar pay scales and policies as public schools to avoid legal issues with contract 
nonrenewal. Private schools sometimes shy away from merit pay based on ethical or 
organizational beliefs as well.  
 Teacher attitude and motivation are the most important indicators in successful 
implementation of any alternative compensation model. Teachers must believe the plan 
is fair, and they must value the structure of the model. Money does motivate teachers as 
in any other field, but the primary motivator is improved student achievement (Odden & 
Kelley, 1996). Unique performance-based compensation models are ongoing and funded 
by the Department of Education through the TIF grant funds and Race to the Top 
program funds. Educational reformers will continue to lobby for improved teacher 
quality that in turn leads to improved student achievement for our nation and 
performance-based compensation models will continue to be investigated. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODS 
 
Introduction 
 The primary purpose of this study was to compare teachers’ perceptions and 
attitudes toward performance pay components of the TAP program in four Texas school 
districts to those responses of survey questions about implementation and perceived 
equity of a performance-based compensation program in four non-TAP schools districts 
or schools without a performance pay program. In addition, I investigated the 
perceptions and attitudes of the teachers toward the program components in regards to 
influencing their teaching practices through added professional development 
Research Design 
 A mixed-methods approach with both quantitative and qualitative methods was 
used in the participating districts as related to the research questions. A survey design 
described by Creswell (2003) as a “design that provides quantitative or numeric 
description of trends, attitudes, or opinions of a population by studying a sample of that 
population” (p. 153) was used for the quantitative portion of the study.  
 The strategy for the qualitative component of my study was the case study of a 
participating school district in the form of focus group interviews. The focus group 
interview questions were general and open-ended to elicit views and opinions from the 
participants (Creswell, 2003). The data collected from the survey instrument and the 
focus group interviews from the school districts were analyzed to provide information 
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that may be used by school districts in Texas to determine if the TAP program or a 
similar performance based compensation program may be considered as one of their 
alternatives for an incentive pay plan.  
 According to Creswell, Klassen, Plano Clark, and Clegg Smith (2011) “mixed 
method research is more than simply collecting qualitative and quantitative evidence, it 
involves the intentional collection of both types of data and the combination of the 
strengths of each to answer research questions” (p. 5). Collecting both quantitative and 
qualitative data simultaneous gave me a better connection to the data and strengthened 
my study. The chapter is organized into four sections: (a) selection of participants, (b) 
instrumentation, (c) data collection, and (d) data analysis and with a summary at the end 
of the chapter.  
Selection of Participants 
 
Quantitative Participants 
 
Participants of TAP school districts were solicited from a list of the school 
districts in Texas that currently use the TAP program as a performance-based 
compensation model as reported by The National Institute for Excellence in Teaching 
(NIET). A request to participate was sent by email to each of the 10 TAP school districts 
superintendent (see Appendix A) explaining the record of study. Out of the 10 school 
districts, five replied in the affirmative that they would be willing to forward the survey 
to their teachers on the TAP campuses.  
However, only four actually did forward the survey to their teachers; one district 
administrator did not forward the survey link. When I called a principal at that school 
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district, I was informed that they never received the link from the district administration, 
and therefore, no responses were recorded from that district. Of the five districts that 
would not participate, one district said that request for research in their district was only 
approved in the fall of a school year and the other four school districts did not reply.  
A letter of authorization was sent to the five school districts that agreed to 
participate (see Appendix B). They were asked to sign the letter of authorization and 
return to me on school district letterhead to submit to the IRB at Texas A&M University 
for approval. Participants of five non-TAP school districts were also sent a request to 
participate based on similar enrollment and an authorization letter similar to the TAP 
schools. Only four of the non-TAP school districts responded with an authorization form 
in time for IRB approval. The larger school districts use the TAP program in a limited 
number of schools, and those were the campuses requested to participate in the survey. 
The breakdown of the enrollment of each participant school district is listed in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Size Comparison of Participating School Districts 
TAP Districts Enrollment Non-TAP Districts Enrollment 
A 12,282 A 13,275 
B 3934 B 3872 
C 357 C 530 
D 186 D 339 
 
 
 The confidential survey link was sent to each teacher in the school districts that 
agreed to participate in my study. The TAP schools responded at a rate of 32% and the 
non-TAP at a rate of 40%. Table 3 illustrates the anonymous survey respondent numbers 
included. The number of teachers working on each campus was taken from the 2013-
2014 TAPR report from the Texas Education Agency. The appropriate sample size for 
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my study was determined by using information from Krejcie and Morgan (1970). The 
suggested sample size for the population surveyed was 254 responses for the TAP school 
districts and 248 responses for the non-TAP school districts.  
 
Table 3. Anonymous Survey Respondent School Districts 
Authorized  Total   Total  Percentage 
School  Possible   Survey    
Districts   Teachers   Respondents   
TAP       
4  789  254  32% 
       
Non-TAP      
4   732   295   40% 
 
 
 The target population for my study was classroom teachers from each of the four 
school districts that were included in the performance-based compensation component of 
the TAP program and four school districts that were not in a performance-based 
compensation program of any kind. All teachers at both types of selected districts were 
invited to participate in the study and were sent the anonymous survey link through the 
Qualtrics online survey system and participation was voluntary.  
Qualitative Participants 
 
 According to Hays and Singh (2012), participants in the study are the “experts in 
relation to the phenomenon under study” (p. 8); therefore, selecting participants for the 
detail they could provide about the TAP program was crucial. A focus group from three 
TAP campuses that included an elementary campus (grades K-5), middle school campus 
(grades 6-8), and a high school campus (grades 9-12) at one TAP school district was 
selected based on volunteers from each campus. The focus group district was selected 
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due to proximity to reduce travel time and expenses. Contact was made with the district 
administrator in charge of the TAP program to request permission to conduct focus 
groups in their district (see Appendix C). Each campus principal was forwarded an email 
through the district administrator requesting permission to interview from 5-8 teachers 
on their campuses.  
 A mixed-model approach that includes an anonymous participant survey and 
focus group interviews was conducted to give the study more creditability. The 
instruments used in this study included both quantitative and qualitative strategies to 
gather information that may be useful to future leaders considering a performance pay 
program in their own school districts.  
Instrumentation 
 
 Similar survey instruments were administered to the participants in the TAP 
schools (see Appendix D) and non-TAP schools (see Appendix E), prompting responses 
to gain insight on my research questions about the teacher’s perception and attitudes of 
performance pay. To increase construct validity of my survey instruments, items that 
were used in previous studies from Vanderbilt University to evaluate performance pay 
models were adapted and used with permission from Dr. Matthew Springer (see 
Appendix F). In addition, Dr. Sandra Forand from Northeastern University in Boston, 
Massachusetts, granted permission (see Appendix G) to modify some of her survey 
questions from a similar study on teacher attitudes and perceptions about performance 
pay that she conducted (Forand, 2012).  
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Likert item answer choices ranging from strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, 
and strongly disagree were used. An internal consistency reliability coefficient was 
calculated on both survey instruments using Cronbach’s alpha. The reliability coefficient 
for the TAP survey instrument was .808, and the reliability coefficient for the non-tap 
instrument was .809. A breakdown of the two sections of the TAP survey instrument 
follows. Demographic information on the survey was used as independent variables:  
1. Gender 
2. Years’ experience: (0-5, 6-10, 11-15, 16-20, 21-25, 26 or more) 
3. Indicate your category as an educator: Probationary contract, Term contract 
4. Indicate your work assignment: Elementary, Middle, High School 
5. Indicate your current position: STAAR-tested subject, Special Education 
teacher, Elective teacher (art, PE, music, technology education, vocational, 
library/media, other)  
 The next set of questions was used to measure the participant’s perceptions and 
attitudes toward the TAP program on a scale of strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, 
and strongly disagree): 
6. The current TAP incentive pay structure is an adequate way to pay educators. 
7. I believe that my performance pay should be (a) based on student STAAR 
test scores; (b) based on performance of students in my classroom (individual 
growth, portfolios, targeted growth, other); or (c) based on building wide 
STAAR performance criteria. 
8. TAP performance pay is the best option to increase teacher wages. 
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9. TAP performance pay is a fair way to reward teacher performance. 
10. TAP performance pay will affect the retention of highly qualified teachers. 
11. The principle of relating teachers’ pay to performance is a good one. 
12. The idea of the TAP performance pay for teachers is fundamentally unfair. 
13. Experience on the job should count more towards determining pay levels. 
14. TAP performance pay will be problematic because it is hard to link the work 
done in schools to individual performance. 
15. TAP performance pay will have no effect on the quality of my work because 
it is already at the appropriate standard. 
16. TAP performance pay has made the staff less willing to assist colleagues. 
17. TAP performance pay has undermined staff morale. 
18. TAP performance pay has discouraged teamwork and cooperation between 
teachers. 
19. The TAP performance pay motivates me to improve my teaching skills. 
20. The TAP performance pay components: (a) leads to greater motivation 
amongst teachers, (b) has a positive effect on teacher recruitment, (c) has a 
positive effect on teacher retention, (d) reinforces good performance, (e) 
results in better and more effective teaching, (f) improves the quality of my 
work, (g) increases the quantity of my work, (h) makes me work harder, (i) 
makes me work longer hours, and (j) causes resentment among staff. 
A case study qualitative approach as described by Creswell (2003) as exploring 
the depth of a program, an event, an activity, a process or one or more individuals was 
 46 
used in my study. To gather information for the study, three focus group interview 
sessions, one from each designated school type: elementary (grades K-5), middle (grades 
6-8), and high school (grades 9-12) were held on the campus of each school. I conducted 
the focus group interviews with approval from the school administration. The interview 
questions for the focus group consisted of open-ended and general questions to illicit 
discussion for the focus group script used (see Appendix H).  
Data Collection 
I used both quantitative and qualitative methodologies for data collection in my 
study. The online survey responses and focus group interviews were conducted 
concurrently. The following sections were explained sequentially beginning with the 
quantitative process followed by the qualitative procedures.  
Quantitative Data Collection 
My initial step to collecting quantitative data for this study was to email a request 
to the school district superintendents of authorized TAP school districts detailing my 
study and asking to distribute a survey link to the principals in their school districts that 
in turn would be forwarded to the teachers at the designated TAP campuses. The same 
procedure was followed for non-TAP school districts that had agreed to participate. 
Once permission was granted, an online survey link, using Qualtrics survey software, 
was distributed to each participating school district through the email of the district 
administration to be sent to all participating TAP and non-TAP campuses. Qualtrics is an 
online survey tool that has the capability to compile anonymous results and export data 
for analysis in a statistical format.  
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The purpose and goals of the survey were given in a brief introduction to each 
participant when they decided to complete the survey in an introduction section included 
in the online survey. The survey link was open to both groups of participating school 
districts for three weeks near the end of the school year. A reminder email was sent to 
the district contact at the end of each week to enlist more participants.  
Qualitative 
 
 To gather more in-depth perceptions of the teachers at one TAP school district 
about the current performance pay program used, I asked permission to perform focus 
group interviews at three campuses of the school district (Sunset ISD, a pseudonym) in 
close proximity to my school district. The district administrative contact assisted in 
setting up interview times with each principal at an elementary, middle, and high school 
at the TAP school district. The focus groups were scheduled based on the availability of 
the teachers during the school day. Participation in the focus group was voluntary at each 
campus. Focus group participants were given consent forms (Appendix I) at the 
beginning of each interview session with information regarding their privacy and the 
structure and process. I explained the purpose for my study and reinforced that all 
information was completely anonymous and gave each participant a chance to decline 
being interviewed. No one declined being interviewed. Focus group participants 
included five elementary teachers (four females and one male), five middle school 
teachers (two females and three males), and four high school teachers (one female and 
three males).  
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I conducted the group sessions at each campus as an outside researcher to 
alleviate any concern about maintaining confidentiality and to not influence any answers 
from the groups. An interview protocol, as suggested by Creswell (2007), was created 
that included designating each participant with letters on a place card on the table in 
front of them, i.e., participant A, B, C, D, E. Each participant was given a pseudonym for 
this study to ensure confidentiality. A list of responses were written in the form of field 
notes as each participant responded to the questions in order to recall which participant 
responded to each question and in what order. The groups were asked to describe their 
perceptions of the performance pay components of the TAP program in the district they 
were employed using a predetermined script of open-ended questions. Each session 
lasted between 45 minutes to 1 hour and was recorded using a digital audio recorder to 
maintain privacy of each participant. The transcripts from each focus group session were 
transcribed verbatim from the digital audio file to maintain accuracy of the information 
collected. The data files were kept on a password-protected computer with access only to 
me.  
Data Analysis 
 
 The data analysis section of this chapter also occurred in sequential order with 
quantitative analysis followed by qualitative data analysis.  
Quantitative Data 
 The response from each online survey question was downloaded into a 
spreadsheet and the data were imported into the Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS). The demographic variables were measured on a nominal scale and 
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were analyzed with descriptive statistical procedures including measures of percentages 
and frequencies. A one-way ANOVA was performed to compare the TAP and non-TAP 
groups and their responses to the online survey questions on performance pay models. 
The perceptions and attitudes section of the survey that was answered on the 5-point 
scale of strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree, was coded using an 
interval scale. The research questions were analyzed with frequencies, percentages, 
measures of central tendency, and variability.  
Qualitative Data 
 
 Focus group transcripts were analyzed using the two-step process of analytic 
induction as described by (Patton, 2002). The first step involved analyzing the data to 
identify and code themes and patterns. The transcripts of each grade level group were 
reviewed separately and themes for each interview were established using an Excel 
spreadsheet with nine columns, one for each interview question, to record topics that 
emerged from each group in each area. A compilation of the major topics from each 
focus group interview was also entered onto a separate Excel spreadsheet, with four 
columns, one for each major theme that developed, with quotes from the participants that 
gave insight into their perceptions of each question on the different components of the 
TAP performance pay program.  
 The second phase was to take a fresh look at the data and to see if any new 
themes or patterns emerged that were missed on the first analysis. Peer debriefing was 
used to accomplish this. Dr. Randy Ewing, a retired superintendent, was enlisted to 
review my study and data to give me an outside opinion of the findings. The questions 
 50 
for the focus group were scripted prior to the interviews and contained specific questions 
that related to the research questions of the study. Open-ended questions were used to 
gain more insight into “What components of the TAP performance pay model did the 
teachers feel were beneficial?” and “What did the teachers suggest as ways to improve 
the TAP performance pay model?” 
 Validity of the data was addressed by using data triangulation as described by 
(Denzin, 1978). By interviewing groups from three different grade spans, including 
elementary, middle, and high school teachers who were comprised of male and female 
teachers with varying degrees of teaching experience, the study included a variety of 
data sources.  
Summary 
 
 The methods for data collection for my study were a combination of quantitative 
and qualitative methods in order to compare the perceptions of more than one school 
district and their teachers’ perceptions of the performance-based compensation 
component of the TAP program. The data were collected using online surveys of 
teachers from TAP and non-TAP schools and focus group interviews from a TAP school 
district. Permission was sought and granted from each district prior to attempting to 
contact any employees from the districts.  
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CHAPTER IV 
PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF DATA 
 
Introduction 
 The intent of this study was to gather data on the perceptions of two groups of 
teachers on performance-based compensation components for educators, specifically a 
group of teachers involved in the TAP program in Texas and a group of teachers not 
involved in any performance pay model or non-TAP. A mixed-method approach was 
used to gather data from the participants. An online anonymous survey was performed 
with both the TAP school district teachers and the non-TAP school district teachers, 
inquiring about their perceptions of a performance pay model to reward teachers. The 
results of the surveys were used in the quantitative data portion of the study. Qualitative 
data were collected from focus group interviews from one TAP district to determine 
beliefs and perceptions of teachers from three grade spans: elementary, middle, and high 
school.  
 Chapter IV presents the analysis of the quantitative data using descriptive 
statistics to address the three primary research questions of the study. Research question 
1 asked, “How do teachers in TAP school districts perceive the performance pay 
components of TAP?” Research question 2 asked, “How do teachers in non-performance 
pay schools perceive performance pay program components? Research question 3 asked, 
“How do these two groups of teachers’ perceptions compare to one another about 
performance pay models?  
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 Research questions 1 and 2 about the perceptions of teachers toward performance 
pay components are addressed with the use of tables that divide the anonymous survey 
questions into four categories. The categories include the use of student standardized test 
scores, specifically the STAAR test in Texas, as an indicator of teacher success and thus 
earning extra pay. A second category is the concept of performance pay itself in 
compensating teachers in addition to their actual salary. The third category analyzes the 
survey responses to the effort of the teacher and if performance pay incentives have any 
bearing on that work. Finally, questions that can be linked to school climate are 
discussed from the standpoint of each group.  
Two secondary research questions developed in my study are analyzed next with 
data gathered from a qualitative method using focus group interviews at a TAP school 
district, “What components of performance pay models do the teachers feel are 
beneficial?” and “What do teachers suggest as ways to improve performance pay 
models?” The analysis includes themes that surfaced from each interview transcript and 
specific perceptions from the different grade levels and years of experience of the 
participants.  
Quantitative Data 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Participants in the study had the opportunity to respond to an anonymous survey 
using Likert items on a 5-point scale with response 1 corresponding to strongly agree, 2 
to agree, 3 to neutral, 4 to disagree, and 5 strongly disagree. Scores lower than the 
midpoint of 3, lean toward agreement with the question and scores higher represent 
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disagreement. The data from the surveys were collected and analyzed using the survey 
components from the online program Qualtrics. A one-way ANOVA was performed to 
determine any significant differences between the TAP and non-TAP teachers in their 
response to the online survey questions. The null hypothesis would be there is no 
difference in perceptions between the TAP teachers and non-TAP teachers. A 
significance level of .05 was used for each statistical analysis. The effect size for each 
survey statement that showed a significant difference from the one-way ANOVA 
analysis between TAP and non-TAP teachers is noted for each category of the online 
survey.  
Each table includes a list of the questions compiled for the category detailed in 
the introduction to this chapter, designates the respondent non-TAP for the participants 
who are not teaching in a TAP school and TAP for the participants who do work in a 
TAP school, gives the number of respondents who answered the question, the mean of 
the response from the participants, and the standard deviation. Using the Qualtrics 
program data analysis feature, a demographic comparison of both TAP and Non-TAP 
participants was created and is pictured in Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Demographics of Survey Participants 
 Gender Years 
Experience 
Contract 
Type 
Grade level 
Taught 
Subject 
Taught 
 
TAP Male 21% 
Female 79% 
0-15     75% 
16 +     26% 
Term    84% 
Prob.    16% 
Elem 43% 
Middle 34% 
High 19% 
Comb. 4% 
STAAR 49% 
Elective 23% 
Core Non 
STAAR 27% 
Non-TAP Male 24% 
Female 76% 
0-15      67% 
16 +      34% 
Term     86% 
Prob.    14% 
Elem 51% 
Middle 22% 
High 22% 
Comb. 6% 
STAAR 49% 
Elective 21% 
Core Non 
STAAR 30% 
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Student standardized test scores. Table 5 shows that non-TAP teachers believe 
more strongly in not using STAAR scores for an indicator of teacher performance pay 
with a mean score of 4.07 or disagree, while TAP teachers are more neutral with a mean 
score of 3.21. However, the TAP teachers agree more than non-TAP teachers that the 
performance pay should be based on other indicators in the classroom, 2.92 for TAP and 
3.63 for non-TAP. The teachers in TAP schools agree that performance pay should be 
based on school-wide STAAR scores as an indicator with a mean of 2.32 in opposition 
to non-TAP schools that scored closer to the disagree side with a mean of 3.67. 
 
Table 5. Survey Responses Regarding Test Scores 
I believe that 
performance 
pay should be  
 
Participant 
 
N 
 
Mean 
 
SD 
based on 
student  
STAAR test 
scores. 
 
Non-TAP 
TAP 
 
259 
215 
4.07 
3.21 
1.081 
1.124 
based on other 
performance 
indicators of 
students in my 
classroom. 
 
Non-TAP 
TAP 
 
260 
210 
2.92 
3.63 
1.342 
1.147 
based on 
building-wide 
STAAR 
performance 
criteria. 
Non-TAP 
TAP 
 
258 
213 
3.67 
2.32 
1.218 
1.129 
 
 
From Table 5, the questions related to student test scores (STAAR). In reporting 
the significant results with the one-way ANOVA for the three questions in Table 5, the 
TAP teachers are more agreeable that STAAR test scores should be used for 
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performance indicators (TAP = 215) (non-TAP = 259), F (1,214, 258) = 71.628 < .00 a 
medium effect size of ƞ2 = .066 was found for this statement. They are also more 
agreeable than non-TAP teachers that school-wide STAAR scores should be used in a 
performance pay calculation (TAP = 213) (non-TAP = 258), F (1, 212,257) = 153.419 < 
0.00, a medium effect size of ƞ2 = .104 was found for this statement. 
Teacher performance pay. Using the same format as Table 5 for the second 
category, the concept of performance pay itself and how teachers from both groups 
perceive them is examined using Table 6. Both the non-TAP and TAP teachers seemed 
to be neutral or lean slightly to disagree in their belief that performance pay is the best 
option to increase teacher wages, is a fair way to reward teacher performance, has a 
positive effect on teacher retention of highly qualified people, and that relating a 
teacher’s pay to performance is a good principle. Non-TAP teachers agreed that the idea 
of performance pay is fundamentally unfair with a mean of 2.47, and TAP teachers were 
neutral in their responses to this question. Using years of experience as a more 
meaningful way to pay teachers was agreeable to both TAP and non-TAP educators. 
From Table 6 for the questions relating to teacher performance pay, the results 
showed a statistically significant difference with respect to category of educator or 
contract type, either probationary or continuing contract. In reporting the significant 
results with the one-way ANOVA for the questions in Table 6, the non-TAP teachers 
were more agreeable that performance pay was unfair (TAP = 214) (non-TAP = 260), F 
(1,213, 259) = 21.764 < .00, a small effect size of ƞ2 = .024 was found for this statement. 
They also agreed more than TAP teachers that years of experience should count more 
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toward determining pay levels for teachers (TAP = 213) (non-TAP = 260), F (1,212, 
259) = 17.512 < .00, a small effect size of ƞ2 = .012 was found was found for this 
statement. 
 
Table 6. Survey Responses Regarding Teacher Performance Pay 
I believe that  Participant N Mean SD 
performance pay 
is the best option 
to increase 
teacher wages. 
 
Non-TAP 
TAP 
 
256 
211 
3.82 
3.40 
1.074 
1.181 
performance pay 
is a fair way to 
reward teacher 
performance. 
 
Non-TAP 
TAP 
 
259 
213 
3.51 
3.63 
1.268 
1.036 
performance pay 
will positively 
affect the 
retention of 
highly qualified 
teachers. 
 
the principle of 
relating teachers’ 
pay to 
performance is a 
good one. 
 
the idea 
performance pay 
for teachers is 
fundamentally 
unfair. 
 
years of 
experience on the 
job should count 
more towards 
determining pay 
levels. 
 
Non-TAP 
TAP 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-TAP 
TAP 
 
 
 
 
Non-TAP 
TAP 
 
 
 
 
Non-TAP 
TAP 
 
260 
212 
 
 
 
 
 
260 
212 
 
 
 
 
260 
213 
 
 
 
 
260 
213 
3.41 
3.11 
 
 
 
 
 
3.53 
3.50 
 
 
 
 
2.47 
3.00 
 
 
 
 
2.46 
2.90 
1.374 
1.232 
 
 
 
 
 
1.212 
1.230 
 
 
 
 
1.213 
1.237 
 
 
 
 
1.173 
1.063 
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Teacher’s work. A third category that the respondents were asked to give their 
opinion on was the work that the teachers do, including quality and quantity of work, 
effort put into their job, and the hours they dedicate to teaching. The final question 
delineated in Table 7 gives a response to the problem of linking the improvement of 
student achievement to one specific teacher. The non-TAP teachers disagreed when it 
came to a performance pay component improving the quality of a teacher’s work or 
instruction, whereas the TAP teachers were on the agree side of the question. They both 
were in the neutral range when it came to increasing the quantity of work by teachers 
and if a performance pay incentive would make teachers work harder.  
The TAP teachers did agree that the component would have teachers working 
longer hours, rating the question at 2.74 when the non-TAP group scored it in the neutral 
range at 3.16. When asked about linking the work of one individual teacher to student 
achievement, the non-TAP teachers leaned toward strongly agree with a 1.90 mean, that 
would be problematic, while the TAP teachers were closer to the neutral range at a mean 
of 2.64. In reporting the significant results with the one-way ANOVA for the questions 
in Table 7, the TAP teachers were more agreeable that a performance pay component 
improved the quality of work (TAP = 215) (non-TAP = 262), F (1,214, 261) = 36.084 < 
.00, a small effect size of ƞ2 = .017 was found for this statement. They also agreed more 
than the non-TAP teachers that the performance pay component would make them work 
longer hours (TAP = 214) (non-TAP = 261), F (1,213, 260) = 13.340 < .00, a small 
effect size of ƞ2 = .013 was found for this statement. 
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Table 7. Survey Responses Regarding Work 
 
 
School climate. In Table 8, the participants were asked questions that contribute 
to the school climate when a performance pay component is involved. The topics were 
teacher motivation, resentment among staff members, willingness to assist colleagues, 
staff morale, and teamwork and cooperation among teachers. The TAP teachers agreed 
with a 2.49 mean response that the performance pay component increased motivation of 
teachers, but the non-TAP teachers were more neutral in their responses with a mean of 
3.35.  
 
  
Performance 
Pay Component 
Participant N Mean SD 
 
improves the 
quality of my 
work. 
 
Non-TAP 
TAP 
 
262 
215 
3.53 
2.89 
1.140 
1.169 
increases the 
quantity of my 
work. 
 
Non-TAP 
TAP 
 
262 
215 
3.26 
3.02 
1.214 
1.150 
makes me work 
harder. 
 
makes me work 
longer hours. 
 
is problematic 
because it is 
hard to link the 
work done in 
schools to 
individual 
teachers. 
 
Non-TAP 
TAP 
 
Non-TAP 
TAP 
 
Non-TAP 
TAP 
 
 
 
 
 
261 
214 
 
261 
214 
 
262 
214 
 
 
 
 
3.50 
3.10 
 
3.16 
2.74 
 
1.90 
2.64 
 
 
 
 
1.115 
1.158 
 
1.267 
1.240 
 
.959 
1.277 
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Table 8. Survey Responses Regarding Climate 
A performance pay 
component  
Participant N Mean SD 
 
leads to greater 
motivation 
amongst teachers. 
 
Non-TAP 
TAP 
 
260 
213 
3.35 
2.49 
1.217 
1.160 
causes resentment 
among staff. 
Non-TAP 
TAP 
 
262 
214 
2.05 
2.96 
1.096 
1.190 
 
makes the staff 
less willing to 
assist colleagues  
 
may undermined 
staff morale. 
 
may discourage 
teamwork and 
cooperation 
between teachers. 
 
  
 Non-TAP 
TAP 
 
 
Non-TAP 
TAP 
 
Non-TAP 
TAP 
 
 
 
261 
214 
 
 
261 
214 
 
261 
214 
 
 
 
2.45 
2.13 
 
 
2.08 
2.39 
 
2.36 
3.31 
 
 
 
1.184 
.973 
 
 
1.019 
.990 
 
1.190 
.997 
 
 
 
 
Both groups of educators agreed that a performance pay incentive might create 
resentment among teachers, make them less willing to assist each other, and undermine 
staff morale. Interestingly, the TAP teachers were neutral with a mean of 3.31 when it 
came to teamwork and cooperation, but they were agreeable that it would inhibit 
teachers assisting each other with a mean of 2.13, as the non-TAP teachers continued the 
trend in this category of agreeing that it may be a possibility with a mean score of 2.36. 
In reporting the significant results with the one-way ANOVA for the questions in 
Table 8, the non-TAP teachers were more agreeable that a performance pay component 
caused resentment amongst staff (TAP = 214) (non-TAP = 261), F (1,213, 260) = 76.290 
< .00, a small effect size of ƞ2 = .028 was found for this statement. They also agreed 
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more than TAP teachers that the performance pay component would undermine staff 
morale (TAP = 214) (non-TAP = 261), F (1,213, 260) = 10.701 < .00, a small effect size 
of ƞ2 = .010 was found for this statement.  
 In analyzing the data from the online survey within the four categories, I have 
described some major themes that emerged. Category 1, using student test scores as an 
indicator toward teacher performance pay, the non-TAP teachers disagreed with using 
test scores and the TAP teachers were more neutral. In the second category, performance 
pay itself, both groups were in the neutral to disagree range when it came to using a 
performance pay model.  
The third category, teacher work, seemed to be neutral responses for the non-
TAP teachers but agreeable to the TAP teachers who had actually been in a program. 
They both agreed that it was hard to link the work done or effectiveness in schools to 
one individual. Effectiveness of a good teacher, Dee and Keys (2004) argued that it is 
very hard to evaluate and the “evaluation problem” (p. 472) in schools is compounded 
by the fact that there are so many variables and goals in schools other than simply 
student achievement. In discussing the fourth category, both the non-TAP and TAP 
teachers agreed that a performance pay component might affect the school climate of a 
campus by causing resentment, undermining staff morale and discouraging teachers to 
assist and work with colleagues.  
 Table 9 compiles the information regarding the questions about work from 
Sunset ISD teachers who responded to the anonymous online survey. Sunset ISD is the 
same district where I conducted the focus group interviews at three different campuses: 
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one elementary school, one middle school, and one high school campus. I wanted to 
compare the survey responses from the three campus groups with the themes that 
emerged from the focus group interviews. 
 
 
Table 9. Sunset ISD Participants by Grade Level Regarding Work 
*District total number may contain teachers who are in combined grade level 
assignments. 
 
  
TAP 
Performance 
Pay Component 
Participant N Mean SD 
 
improves the 
quality of my 
work. 
Elementary 
Middle 
High School 
District Total 
52 
22 
40 
122* 
2.87 
2.36 
2.98 
2.82 
 
1.07 
1.18 
1.23 
1.16 
 
increases the 
quantity of my 
work. 
 
Elementary 
Middle 
High School 
District Total 
52 
22 
40 
122* 
 
2.42 
2.27 
2.53 
2.43 
 
1.14 
1.12 
1.28 
1.16 
 
makes me work 
harder. 
 
 
 
makes me work 
longer hours. 
 
 
 
is problematic 
because it is 
hard to link the 
work done in 
schools to 
individual 
teachers 
Elementary 
Middle 
High School 
District Total 
 
Elementary 
Middle 
High School 
District Total 
 
Elementary 
Middle 
High School 
District Total 
 
 
 
 
52 
22 
40 
122* 
 
52 
22 
40 
122* 
 
52 
22 
40 
122* 
 
 
 
 
2.71 
2.36 
2.65 
2.65 
 
2.23 
2.32 
2.45 
2.37 
 
2.06 
2.55 
2.25 
2.21 
 
 
 
 
1.16 
1.22 
1.14 
1.32 
 
1.06 
1.18 
1.34 
1.19 
 
0.98 
1.30 
1.01 
1.06 
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The participants at each grade level seemed to respond in the agreement category 
to the entire set of questions about work with the high school teachers closer to neutral 
for all questions. The middle school teachers scored every question closer to the agree 
index except for the question dealing with the problematic nature of linking work in 
schools to one individual where the elementary staff was virtually to the agree index 
with a 2.06. The results and analysis of the focus group interviews follow in the 
qualitative section.  
Qualitative Data 
 
 The qualitative data analysis section of this chapter is delineated by using the 
four major themes that emerged from the interviews in the TAP school district as 
headings for discussion: (a) transparency and communication of procedures for 
performance pay, (b) reliability of observations and evaluations of teachers, (c) 
additional workload not worth the pay, and (d) increased professional development 
evolving as the strongest part of the program. Within each of these sections, I will relate 
the analysis of each focus group topic to the literature reviewed in Chapter II and 
compare it to information from Lewis Solomon, former President of the TAP 
foundation, in his 2005 presentation at Harvard University. In that presentation, he 
explained the implementation of the TAP program in its textbook form (Solomon, 2005). 
In comparing my results with Solomon, the intent was to describe the opinions of the 
teachers in a TAP school district as compared to the optimum expectations of a TAP 
school as Mr. Solomon presents.   
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Examples of responses from each theme were given for focus group participants 
using pseudonyms for confidentiality. Table 10 shows the participants in more detail 
with pseudonyms for each grade level span of teachers and demographic information 
that included gender, years’ experience, grade level and subject taught at the time of the 
interview, and that was collected at the beginning the focus group interviews.  
 
 
 
Themes 
The four themes that emerged from the focus group interviews are discussed in 
the following order: (a) transparency and communication of procedures for performance 
pay, (b) reliability of observations and evaluations of teachers, (c) additional workload 
not worth the pay, and (d) increased professional development evolving as the strongest 
part of the program. 
Table 10. Focus Group Participants 
  Participants Gender Experience Grade Subject 
Elementary Samantha Female 3 years 4th Reading/ELA 
 Syndi Female 18 years 2nd All 
 Andi Female 7 years 2nd  All 
 James Male 10 years 2nd All 
 Kalli Female 12 years 4th  Reading/ELA 
      
Middle Troy Male 13 years 8th Math 
 Kyle Male 8 years 6th-8th  PE 
 Daniel Male 9 years 6th Math 
 Debbi Female 1st year 8th Sp. Ed 
 Bekki Female  1st year 7th Social St. 
      
High School Derek Male 5 years 10th  ELA 
 Zach Male 9 years 9th-12th CTE-Ag. 
 Misti Female 25 years 9th-12th Elective 
 Brad Male 10 years 11th Social St. 
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Transparency and Communication 
 Under this heading, subtopics that needed more transparency and better 
communication included staff input before implementation, amount of bonus pay that 
can be earned, how value added and school-wide scores are calculated from STAAR 
data. Analyzing the data from the different grade levels of teachers who were 
interviewed at the TAP school district, Sunset ISD, unmasked many of the reasons why 
so many performance pay models fail. Odden and Conley (1992) discussed that 
performance pay plans must be agreeable to all parties and understood by teachers to be 
successful. Solomon (2005) stated that one of the reasons performance pay plans fail is 
that it is imposed on teachers.  
As I will discuss, the Sunset ISD teachers who were interviewed had very strong 
opinions about the TAP program. When asked if the staff had any input in the 
implementation of the program, several teachers at each campus were very clear that the 
program was imposed on them and was not fully explained to them in a transparent way. 
Samantha, an elementary teacher said, “We were just told that the program was being 
expanded to the elementary, there was no input.” Similar statements from the middle 
school and high school teachers corroborated Samantha’s comment. Misti from Sunset 
High School stated, “A better explanation of the program was needed, they (school 
administration) were very defensive when challenged on the explanations, and they 
don’t like it when you question them.”  
Using the principal-agent theory as my framework as I described in Chapter I, 
the school district is the principal and the teachers are the agents employed to perform 
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the duties that the district requires, improving student achievement. The TAP program 
was inserted in the framework as the contract that was mandated or imposed on the 
agents to accomplish improved student achievement. 
Other areas of the performance pay program were just as mysterious to the staff 
when probed about how much extra money they could earn and how it was calculated. 
The discussion became volatile from several staff members. Kyle, a middle school PE 
teacher became frustrated and divulged, “Payouts are a mystery. It’s like a big secret, 
you have a magic eight ball, and turn it over and see the number you are going to get 
because you have no idea.” A colleague of his, Debbi, spoke in a similar manner, “I have 
knowledge of the rubric but have no idea how the compensation works.” A middle 
school math teacher, Daniel, stated, “It gets hairy when you start messing with people’s 
money.” An English teacher, Derrick, with 10 years’ experience from the high school 
explained his objection to the performance pay components by stating, “The structure 
was very wrong because they don’t account for years’ experience. I get that it should be 
for performance, but experience should count for something.”  
Student growth and value added scoring from student test scores brought about 
many comments about the lack of communication and the enigmatic perception that 
teachers had developed over the TAP implementation process and how the student 
growth and value added scores are derived. James, an elementary teacher, was very calm 
when talking about the communication of the value-added scores and student growth in 
his class when he commented, “Better communication leads to better perception.”  
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On the other end of the spectrum, Zach, a high school Agriculture teacher held 
nothing back when he talked about how using student test scores for one of the factors 
that influences their performance pay stated, “They (students) could really screw us if 
they had any idea about the test score part.” Solomon (2005) described evaluation 
criteria for performance pay as not being fair if the teachers do not understand how 
student test scores are converted into value-added numbers. Along with the secretive 
nature of the value-added score calculations and referring back to the theoretical 
framework, a principal-agent dilemma occurs when the performance pay of the teacher 
is based on the test scores of students that they may have limited influence on or in fact 
do not have in class at all, but may earn performance pay for their test scores. This 
occurs when school-wide scores are determined by a few core teachers, an example 
made clear by Samantha, a fourth-grade reading teacher who commented, “The finger 
points at me, as our fourth-grade reading scores are what determines the campus score.” 
Advancing the idea of having limited influence on students and depending on 
others for test scores, the same high school agriculture teacher, Zach, stated, “I have to 
depend on the core teachers to do well for me to earn extra money; I would rather do it 
myself. It does not seem fair for them to have all the pressure.” 
As noted in Chapter II, the term distributive fairness is used to describe the 
reasonableness of a compensation plan based on the fairness of the components of the 
model. The components include the form of compensation, the dollar amount, and 
formula to reach the monetary reward distributed (Heneman et al., 2007). The interviews 
revealed a lack of understanding on both the dollar amount that could be earned and the 
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formula that determined the bonus. The CECR (2011) reiterated that buy-in from 
teachers is essential for any performance pay plan to be successful. Lack of 
communication and transparency leads to distrust and eventual failure of the program.  
Reliability of Observations and Evaluations 
 
Solomon (2005) stated that a performance pay program must be supported by a 
strong, transparent, and fair teacher evaluation system. He goes on to say that if there is 
fear of bias and nepotism from evaluators or if the teachers do not trust the principal, the 
program has little chance of success. The lack of inter-rater reliability was a major issue 
with many of the teachers with whom I spoke. An additional subtopic was the 
inconsistency in the number of evaluations and walk-throughs the teachers were given 
from year to year. Teacher appraisers are recertified every year in a training that includes 
watching videos of teachers and rating them on a rubric. The human element and 
perceived biases of some of the evaluators was very apparent.  
A high school female teacher, Misti, was adamant about performing the same 
lesson to two different evaluators and receiving totally different scores. She said, “It is 
just a good ‘ole boy system, really, you can take your money and stick it where the sun 
don’t shine. I would rather have my salary step.” A high school mentor teacher and 
evaluator, Brad, commented that the inequity of the scoring between administrators can 
be a problem, elaborating that “every time I sit across from someone in an evaluation 
post conference, I know I am thinking about dollars and so are they and I know it should 
not be that way.” Debbi, a first-year middle school special education teacher, revealed an 
excellent point about knowledge of content that the administrator was observing. She 
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said that, “One evaluator told me that he did not know what inclusion should look like; 
how can he observe me when he doesn’t know what he is looking for?”  
The elementary focus group was not as negative as the other campuses as two of 
the evaluators were on the panel. They agreed that the time it takes to be an evaluator 
and teach your own class was difficult and showed more compassion toward the 
evaluators. One mentor teacher, Kalli, calculated the number of days she was out of her 
own classroom and she missed almost 20 days with training and evaluating other 
teachers. “That is very hard on my own students, having a sub for all those days,” she 
noted. The conversation turned to people leaving the district because of the number of 
observations and walkthroughs with the TAP program. Andi, an elementary teacher with 
seven years’ experience, suggested that, “people left the district because they felt 
hounded by all the walkthroughs and felt their classes were always being interrupted.”  
The number of observations for the TAP program is mandated at four for each 
teacher per year with one of them being a practice observation that does not count for the 
teacher. The number of walkthroughs is a district decision, and it appeared that each 
campus had different procedures for walkthroughs and the number fluctuated. The calm 
elementary teacher James explained that the first year of the program, 2014, he had close 
to 15 walkthroughs on top of the scheduled observations, and this year, 2015, he only 
had two. The middle school process for walk throughs was noted to be erratic in the eyes 
of the group. Bekki, a first-year middle school teacher, said that the feedback she 
received was great from one administrator but was inconsistent from another who 
seemed to use a checklist.  
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Although the evaluation piece of the TAP program is tied to an observation 
rubric, the interpretation of that rubric and the differences of evaluation styles can be 
troublesome if the teachers feel the system is inequitable or unfair. The observation 
rubric adds many more responsibilities to teachers in the TAP program. The next section 
describes perceptions of the additional work for teachers.  
Additional Workload 
 
Solomon (2005) indicated that performance pay models that include additional 
work for teachers with small bonus pay or models that may cause some teachers to 
actually lose money may lead to the failure of performance pay programs. When asked 
about additional duties and work tied to the observational instructional rubric the 
teachers had to become familiar with, the professional learning community meetings 
called cluster time, the sentiment varied. Several teachers said they enjoyed working 
with and learning from other teachers. Odden and Kelley (1996) showed that teachers 
not only value extrinsic rewards but other intrinsic success as well, including 
professional development that improves the quality of their teaching toolbox. Bekki 
from the middle school referred to the additional work as exactly that, “adding to her 
teaching toolbox.” 
An elementary response said that the assignments in cluster helped hold all 
teachers accountable and working toward the same goals for the campus. “TAP does not 
make us work harder; it helps us get better, but you have to have intrinsic motivation to 
be a teacher,” a sentiment expressed by Kalli from the elementary focus group. Intrinsic 
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motivation was also alluded to by Samantha, a second year teacher. She explains that, “I 
enjoy my kids, I love my kids. I am not here because of TAP or anything else.” 
However, when the variable of bonus money was added to the question and 
whether the pay justified the work, a more robust discussion ensued. Zach, from Sunset 
High School was boisterous in expressing his opinion, “They just keep the money if 
that’s what it takes, keep the damn money. We won’t do half the work and still will do 
what we need to get it done.” Misti, the high school teacher with many years’ 
experience, was more defiant when she spoke about the cluster meetings. She expressed 
her disdain by saying, “They wanted me to do homework. I am sorry I am not doing 
homework. I have too many other things to worry about.” Troy from the middle school 
talks about hearing the same information from year to year in the cluster meetings, 
saying, “We hear the same stuff for five years in a row, like really we have to do this all 
over again?” He also goes on to say, “We are like a farm team for other districts. We get 
new teachers coming in, and they will be here one year and then they will go because it 
isn’t worth it.”  
The concept of professional development and adding extra work for teachers and 
then tying it to performance pay by using a rubric to hold teachers accountable for those 
additional duties exposed many emotions from the teachers in the focus groups. The next 
section talks more about the professional development component of TAP and how the 
teachers perceived it.  
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Professional Development 
The focus group interviews from all three campuses did reveal that the chance to 
collaborate in a professional learning community (cluster) was the most successful part 
of the TAP program at their campuses. Comments from several teachers praised the 
concept. James from the elementary group indicated, “It is more enjoyable to be an 
effective teacher and the professional development helps me be more effective.” There 
was a disagreement between two middle school teachers about the cluster time. Debbi 
did not like giving up conference periods to meet as a group explaining, “We basically 
get only one conference period a week.” Bekki her colleague said, “I disagree. For a 
first-year teacher, I would be like a chicken with my head cut off without cluster.” The 
Sunset High School group also was in favor of the cluster time and working with 
colleagues in different subjects.  
Professional development and being able to collaborate with colleagues to 
improve teaching skills is an essential component of the TAP program. Teachers are able 
to deal with areas of improvement or refinements as noted during post-observation 
conferences (Solomon, 2005). The professional development component was by far the 
most agreeable component to keep when the groups were asked how to improve the 
performance pay model. Some of the comments included, “Take the pay out of it and 
keep the professional development,” stated Misti from the high school. Samantha from 
the elementary concurred by saying, “Keep the PD and the feedback, but the pay can 
go.”  
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Adding to the comments on professional development, Debbi, a special 
education teacher from the middle school, had a different opinion. She explains that “I 
probably would not keep any of it (TAP); it’s too frustrating with the amount of stuff we 
have to do for it (the money). Sometimes I feel like it is too much.”  
This section of the qualitative analysis discussed the major themes that evolved 
from the focus group interviews at Sunset school district in South Texas. The research 
questions that my focus group script intended to address included, “What components of 
performance pay models do the teachers feel are beneficial?” and “What do teachers 
suggest as ways to improve performance pay models?” The analysis of the focus group 
interview results and the online anonymous survey will be discussed in the summary of 
this chapter. I will compare the data in detail in Chapter V, Summary, Discussion, and 
Conclusions chapter.  
Summary 
Chapter IV analyzed the data from my study with the first section designated for 
the quantitative methodology and results for the statistical tests that included a one-way 
ANOVA to compare TAP and non-TAP teachers’ perceptions for the responses to an 
anonymous online survey and chi-square measurements to determine any significant 
differences using the demographic information of gender, years of teaching experience, 
contract type (continuing or probationary), grade level taught (elementary, middle or 
high school), and subjects taught (STAAR subject, elective, core but non-STAAR and 
special education. The survey responses were broken into four categories including 
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student standardized test scores, teacher performance pay, teacher work, and school 
climate in the form of tables to simplify the information. 
The qualitative data from the three focus group interviews from the TAP school 
district was summarized in a narrative form with four specific themes that emerged from 
the analysis. Those themes were: (a) transparency and communication of procedures for 
performance pay, (b) reliability of observations and evaluations of teachers, (c) 
additional workload not worth the pay, and (d) increased professional development 
evolving as the strongest part of the program. Each theme was given rich description 
with quotes from participants to reinforce the opinions that came to the forefront as the 
interviews were analyzed. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, DISCUSSION, AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Introduction 
 In this final chapter, I will conclude this record of study with a summary of the 
study I conducted followed by a discussion of the findings from the analysis of 
quantitative and qualitative data. Implications for practice in the current field of 
education were explored as they pertained to future performance pay models and 
recommendations for further research concerning those different incentive pay models 
for teachers are made. I will synthesize my study in the conclusions sections of this 
chapter. 
Summary of Study 
 
 I begin this chapter with a review of the purpose of the study and the theoretical 
framework lens that was used, followed by the research questions that drove the 
methodology I used in conducting the mixed methods study. I was involved in a TAP 
performance pay model in a district and had some questions as to how it was working in 
other schools. I began researching performance pay models and was intrigued by the 
vast difference in components and implementation of the models across the nation.  
 Incentive pay plans for teacher performance have been used in Texas school 
districts for several years with a variety of funding sources including the Governor’s 
Educator Excellence Grant (GEEG), the Texas Educator Excellence Grant (TEEG), and 
District Awards for Teacher Excellence (DATE). Evaluation of these different grants 
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used for local school districts created performance pay programs that have been done by 
the National Center on Performance Incentives through Vanderbilt University (2015) 
with cooperation from the Texas Education Agency in the form of research briefs and 
working papers. The TAP program has been the subject of one of these evaluations and 
reviews the program through the lens of improving tests scores as compared to non-TAP 
schools (Springer, Ballou & Peng, 2008).  
 Surveying the perceptions and attitudes of TAP school district teachers toward 
the incentive pay component of the TAP program in Texas as compared to non-TAP 
schools without any kind of incentive pay program in place seemed to be lacking in the 
research. Comparing the perceptions of the structure of a performance-based 
compensation plan of campuses with and campuses without such a plan gives insight 
into whether the program is sustainable after the grant funds have ended. If the teachers 
feel that the incentive plan is worthwhile and equitable, then the district can make an 
informed decision to sustain the TAP model or invest in another performance-based 
compensation program.  
Purpose of Study 
 The primary purpose of this study was to compare teachers’ perceptions and 
attitudes toward the performance pay components of the TAP program in four Texas 
school districts (254 participants) and their non-TAP (295 participants) counterparts’ 
perceptions of similar performance pay components in four school districts. The school 
districts were matched by using indicators including student enrollment, number of 
teachers, demographic information, and percentage of economically disadvantaged 
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students enrolled at the campus. I wanted to compare the responses to an anonymous 
survey about the implementation and perceived fairness of the TAP performance-based 
compensation program with teachers in school districts without a performance pay 
model to determine their perceptions and attitudes if one were being contemplated by 
their school district.  
 Focus group interviews were conducted at a TAP school district, including 
elementary, middle, and high school groups, to gain more in-depth knowledge of the 
perceptions of teachers at different grade levels and experience levels with the program. 
The data collected from survey instruments of both TAP and non-TAP schools and the 
focus group interviews from the TAP campuses were analyzed to provide information to 
be used by school districts in Texas to determine if the TAP program may be a viable 
choice for a performance-based incentive program and if the campuses without a 
performance pay program would be willing to attempt such a plan in their school 
districts.  
Theoretical Framework 
 
 The study was viewed through the lens of the economic theory of the principal-
agent relationship also known as the agency theory (Mitnick, 1973). In defining the 
principal-agent theory, Delves and Patrick (2010) described the principal-agent 
relationship in the business context as when one person (the principal) engages another 
person (the agent) to perform a service on behalf of the principal.  
 Framing the principal-agent theory for the purpose of this study, I extended the 
reference to local school districts (principals) that adopted the Teacher Advancement 
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Program (the contract) as the performance pay compensation model and the teachers 
(agents) they employ, working toward educating the students in the district. The goal of 
the district in adopting the TAP performance-based compensation model was to provide 
incentives for teachers to improve student achievement through additional pay for 
improving standardized tests scores, positive evaluation results, and increasing 
knowledge and skills in their field.  
Discussion of Findings 
 
 The literature in the field of education and performance pay encompasses many 
aspects of the topic ranging from structure (CECR, 2011; Odden & Conley, 1992; Odden 
& Kelly, 1996) to financing and sustaining the programs (Goldin, 2003; Heneman et al., 
2007; Podgursky & Springer, 2007). The goal of my study was to focus on one specific 
program (TAP) and to compare four school districts that have TAP as a performance pay 
model to four districts that do not have a performance pay model implemented in their 
school district. The following three quantitative research questions guided my study and 
are discussed together in the quantitative findings from my study. The qualitative results 
are discussed using the last two supplemental qualitative questions from the study.  
Quantitative Research Questions and Findings 
 
Research question 1. How do teachers in TAP school districts perceive the 
performance pay components of TAP? 
The finding from the TAP teachers who responded to the survey agreed that the 
performance pay component created some negative issues within their schools including 
creating resentment among teachers, creating an atmosphere where teachers would be 
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less willing to assist colleagues, and undermining the morale of the campus. There were 
positive significant relationships between the perceptions that the performance pay 
component would increase motivation of teachers and the increase of quality work, 
improving teaching skills. However since no comments were included in the survey, 
motivation could be termed either positive or negative. TAP teachers believed that a 
teacher’s years of experience should count more toward salary than a performance pay 
component. According to the data, TAP teachers also believed that a performance pay 
component would have no effect on their work as it was already at the appropriate level. 
Moreover, it was hard to link the work of an individual to student improvement when 
there were so many other things going on in schools.  
Interestingly, the teachers who were involved in TAP programs scored the other 
items in the survey with a neutral indicator. Items that included TAP were a fair way to 
reward teachers, the best option to increase teacher wages, would have a positive effect 
on teacher recruitment, and would retain highly qualified teachers. Other glaring neutral 
scores should be noted on the survey questions that dealt with performance 
payreinforces good performance, results in better and more effective teaching, makes 
us work harder, increases the quantity of our work, and discourages teamwork.  
Ballou (2001) suggested that more teachers are in favor of merit pay plans that 
already exist in their schools. The findings of my study suggested the opposite with the 
TAP program schools that were surveyed; they were neither in favor or disapproving of 
the program. Research questions 2 and 3 are answered with the findings that follow.  
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Research question 2. How do teachers in non-performance pay schools perceive 
performance pay program components?  
Research question 3. How do these two groups of teachers’ perceptions 
compare to one another about performance pay models?  
The findings of the data from the non-TAP teacher survey responses reinforced 
the sentiment from American Federation of Teachers (2010) that compensation plans 
must include multiple measures of student outcome. They disagreed with using only 
STAAR scores for a performance pay indicator and part of it should be based on other 
performance indicators in the classroom. They also agreed that teaching years’ 
experience should count more toward a teacher’s salary. The non-TAP teachers agreed 
that a performance pay model would have no effect on their work as it was already at the 
appropriate level and that it was hard to link the work of an individual to student 
improvement when there were so many other things going on in schools. Non-TAP 
teachers also agreed that the incentive component would discourage teamwork within 
the campus.  
 Comparing the findings for research question 3, both groups of educators, TAP 
and non-TAP, agreed that a performance pay component may create some negative 
issues within their schools. Resentment among teachers and creating an atmosphere 
where teachers would be less willing to assist colleagues and undermining campus 
morale were the scenarios with which they both agreed. They also agreed on the topic 
that a teacher’s years of experience should count for more of the salary for a teacher.  
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 The findings from my data are in opposition to the reports that are disseminated 
by the National Institute for Effective Teaching (NIET), the headquarters for the TAP 
program. While there are many studies on the effectiveness of TAP in raising student 
achievement (NIET, 2015), and there seems to be little doubt that implementing the TAP 
program with fidelity will lead to gains in test scores and value-added scores for 
teachers, the NIET research on teacher attitudes, however, conflicts with the data that 
my study showed. Reasons for this conflict may include the differences in the 
implementation of the program for performance pay incentives across districts. School 
districts may choose to finance the bonus pay in the program in a way that is best for the 
school district. The teachers from both TAP and non-TAP in my study were not in favor 
of the performance incentives. This leads into the qualitative section and the next two 
research questions. 
Qualitative Research Questions’ Findings  
 
Supplemental question 1. “What components of performance pay models do the 
teachers feel are beneficial?” 
 The focus group interviews were very enlightening, and each group interview 
took on a persona of its own. Implementation of the TEEG grant programs were 
evaluated for three consecutive years by Springer et al. (2007, 2008, 2009) where the 
findings suggested that the local design of the plan and the characteristics of the schools 
influenced the attitudes and behaviors of teachers, school environments, and teacher 
turnover. As I conducted the interviews with a script that asked open-ended questions, 
four themes emerged about the program implementation of TAP. The findings of my 
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focus group interviews supported the findings of Springer et al. (2007, 2008, 2009). 
First, it was imposed upon them, there was no input from the stakeholders, and the 
implementation of the plan was not communicated in a way that everyone involved 
could understand. Second, reliability of observations and evaluations of teachers was not 
consistent, and the teachers felt it became a punitive point system. The third theme was 
the additional workload not being worth the incentive pay that they may or may not 
receive. Finally, each group did feel the increased professional development and the 
instructional rubric evolved as the strongest part of the program.  
 The district administration arranged the focus groups and each level was 
completed on their own campus. The elementary group was teachers who had the same 
conference period, as was the middle school group. The high school focus group was 
volunteers who wanted to attend the interview session before school. This may have 
been an invitation for the ones who showed up to vent on negative issues of the program. 
They seemed to be more negative overall than the others were. In “staying with the data” 
as Lunenburg and Irby (2008) suggested, the focus groups were conducted near the end 
of the school year when teachers are more apt to be tired and ready for a break. This may 
have led several of them to express negative opinions, especially the ones who were 
leaving the district.  
Supplemental question 2. “What do teachers suggest as ways to improve 
performance pay models?” 
 The focus groups were asked which part of the program was most beneficial in 
supplemental question 1 and to a person they responded that the professional 
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development and the instructional rubric were the best part for their teaching. Each 
group felt that the money incentive part of the program could be eliminated and a regular 
salary scale step be put back into place. The district had frozen salaries by offering a $50 
a year step raise. This was the crux of the entire rebellion for the teachers interviewed. 
They had no way to determine the amount of bonus money they could earn or whether 
they would get any at all. Several teachers used phrases such as “You can keep the 
money” and “Stick it (the money) where the sun don’t shine.”  
 The findings of the focus group interviews suggested that implementation is the 
most important part of the TAP program. Within the application of all the components of 
the program communication was by far the most talked about issue in the teacher groups 
I interviewed. Followed by the lack of information on the amount of performance or 
bonus pay.  
Implications for Practice 
 
 The purpose of the study was to compare perceptions and attitudes of teachers in 
the TAP program and ones who did not have incentive pay programs in their schools to 
further the educational literature on performance pay models, specifically to give some 
insight into what teachers think about such programs and how they can be better 
constructed and implemented in the future. Implications for future use of the information 
can be distributed to all stakeholders in educational decision-making. School district 
administration may use the findings to help determine pitfalls to avoid if implementing 
the TAP program or another district-created incentive model. As Springer et al. (2007, 
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2008, 2009) suggested, a locally designed incentive plan with stakeholder input is more 
likely to be accepted by teachers.  
 Campus principals should be able to understand the implications of the findings 
by increasing the communication level of any program and listening to the staff when 
they voice their concerns about their salaries and livelihood. This will lead to retaining 
more teachers who would otherwise move to other districts with a stable salary scale. 
Teacher leaders and classroom teachers may be able to further the relationship with 
district administration by expressing their opinions in a fair and nonthreatening 
environment when asked about what kind of incentive program they can help create.  
 Finally, the results of the study may be only a small section of TAP schools in 
Texas, but clearly their opinion of the implementation and the components of the 
program can give way to improved communication and new and untried incentive pay 
plans in the future.  
Recommendations for Further Research 
 In making recommendations for further research in the area of performance pay 
models, it may be beneficial to expand the scope of the studies to include more TAP 
schools and more schools that are thinking about implementing performance pay 
models. The timing of this study could have been better as the online survey and focus 
group interviews were all conducted at the end of a school year. This could have created 
the limitation of several school districts choosing not to participate. Performing a study 
near the middle of a school year and with more focus groups or individual face-to-face 
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interviews of not only teachers but school administrators with outside researchers to lend 
more validity to the answers would give more insight to what they truly think.  
Conclusions 
 This study was conducted as a part of my growing curiosity of how teachers can 
be compensated for the work that they do and creating a way for them to earn additional 
bonus money for the extra effort that so many of them put in. In studying the TAP 
model, the thinking was twofold: I wanted to investigate how other teachers from other 
districts implemented the program and how they were paid.  
In trying to eliminate any bias in the questioning of the participants, I did not ask 
about dollar amounts, specifically in either the survey or focus group interviews. It was 
clear in the focus group that bonus pay was a mystery to many of them as was the case in 
my district several years ago. This uncertainty caused some very uncomfortable 
conversations for administrators with teachers who wanted to know how the amount was 
calculated and rightfully so. The data suggest that a better model can be created to pay 
teachers who actually do the extra work and should be compensated for that effort.  
Epilogue 
Using the research and the data I collected from this study, I will be able to apply 
the information in the upcoming year to help design an incentive pay plan for teachers in 
my school district. The information from the surveys and focus group interviews 
described pitfalls to avoid in the process. A committee of teachers and administrators 
will be gathered to contribute suggestions as to what would be an effective and 
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sustainable plan to pay those teachers who put in the extra effort and should be paid for 
their leadership and additional work.  
 Using the four themes from the focus groups as a guide, we will attempt to have 
more transparency and communicate all of the components constructed by the 
stakeholders, identify and implement a fair evaluation system for teachers, give the 
teachers a choice of doing additional work for additional pay, and provide the 
professional development that the teachers will want and use in their instructional 
practices. The purpose would be to develop a plan that could be used for years to come 
to retain our current teachers and to attract educators in the future.   
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APPENDIX A 
REQUEST TO PARTICIPATE IN STUDY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To Whom It May Concern, 
 
My name is Jimmy Gouard and I am working on my doctoral dissertation study at Texas 
A&M University and would like to send the teachers in your district an online survey to 
gather their perceptions of performance pay. All responses are anonymous and used for 
data collection only. Attached is the information regarding my study.  
 
I would appreciate your participation in my study. I do need an authorization notice of 
some kind on district letterhead for the approval process at Texas A&M. It can be emailed 
back to me at your convenience. Thank you for your time. 
 
 
Jimmy Gouard 
Assistant Superintendent 
Lytle ISD 
830-709-5100 Ex. 4008 
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APPENDIX B 
AUTHORIZATION LETTER TO CONDUCT SURVEY 
 
 
Letter Head 
 
 
 
Date 
 
 
 
I authorize Jimmy Gouard, a doctoral student at Texas A&M University, to conduct an 
online survey and/or focus group interviews in my district this school year (2014-2015) as 
part of his record of study. Both the online survey and the focus group interviews will be 
voluntary and all identities will be kept confidential  
 
 The purpose of this study is to compare the perceptions and attitudes of teachers in TAP 
schools and non-TAP schools regarding performance pay components for teachers. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
 
 
 
Authorizing Signature 
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APPENDIX C 
PERMISSION TO CONDUCT FOCUS GROUP INTERVIEWS 
 
I would like to set up some time to conduct some focus group interviews with a group 
from one of your elementary schools, your junior high, and your high school. I need 5-8 
teachers in each group. Would you be able to help me with this? I can come after school 
or during a conference period. 
 
I will have a set of questions and no names will be used in the results. I will audio tape the 
conversation so I can transcribe the interview for my study.  
 
I know school is almost out, but I need to conduct them before everyone leaves for the 
summer. I am expecting approval from Texas A&M sometime this week. Could I schedule 
something next week or the week of June 1-5th? Let me know thank you.  
 
 
Jimmy Gouard 
Assistant Superintendent 
Lytle ISD 
830-709-5100 Ex. 4008 
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APPENDIX D 
TAP TEACHER ONLINE SURVEY QUESTIONS 
 
My name is Jimmy Gouard and I am working on my doctoral degree at Texas A&M University. 
The topic of my research is: Teachers’ perceptions of the performance pay components of the TAP 
program. I would like to better understand your personal beliefs, perceptions, and attitudes about 
the performance pay components of the TAP program currently in use in your school district. 
 
The following survey is strictly voluntary and I would appreciate your candid input. The results 
of the survey will be confidential and will not include any names of people completing the survey.  
 
I. Demographic Information 
 
1. Gender 
Female  Male 
 
2. Indicate your current level of experience as an educator: 
 
0-5 years  6-10 years  11-15 years  16-20 years  21-25 years  26 or 
more 
 
3. Indicate your category as an educator: 
Term Contract Teacher  Probationary Contract Teacher    
 
4. Indicate your work assignment: 
 Elementary School  Middle School High School 
 
5. Indicate your current position: 
STAAR tested subject   Special Education Teacher  Elective Teacher 
 
II.  Perceptions and attitudes toward the TAP program 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about the TAP 
program in your district. Please check one of the following responses that best fits your 
beliefs.  
 
Strongly Agree (SA) Agree (A) Neutral (N) Disagree (D) Strongly Disagree (SD) 
 
6. The current TAP incentive pay structure is an adequate way to pay educators. 
Strongly Agree (SA) Agree (A) Neutral (N) Disagree (D) Strongly Disagree (SD) 
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7. I believe that my performance pay should be    
• based on student test scores.     (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
• based on performance of students in my classroom. (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
(individual growth, portfolios, targeted growth, other)   
• based on building-wide performance criteria.  (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
8. TAP performance pay is the best option to increase teacher wages. 
 (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
9. TAP performance pay is a fair way to reward teacher performance. 
 (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
10. TAP performance pay will affect the retention of highly qualified teachers. 
 (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
11. The principle of relating teachers’ pay to performance is a good one. 
 (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
12. The idea TAP performance pay for teachers is fundamentally unfair. 
 (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
13. Experience on the job should count more towards determining pay levels. 
 (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
14. The TAP performance pay component:     
leads to greater motivation amongst teachers.  (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
has a positive effect on teacher recruitment.   (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
has a positive effect on teacher retention.   (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
reinforces good performance.     (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
results in better and more effective teaching.  (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
improves the quality of my work.    (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
increases the quantity of my work.    (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
makes me work harder.     (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
makes me work longer hours.    (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
causes resentment among staff.    (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
15. TAP performance pay will be problematic because it is hard to link the work done in 
schools to individual performance. 
 (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
16. TAP performance pay will have no effect on the quality of my work because it is 
already at the appropriate standard. 
(SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
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17. TAP performance pay has made the staff less willing to assist colleagues. 
 (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
18. TAP performance pay has undermined staff morale. 
 (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
19. TAP performance pay has discouraged teamwork and cooperation between teachers. 
 (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
20. The TAP performance pay motivates me to improve my teaching skills. 
 (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
You have reached the end of the survey. Thank you for your participation. 
 100 
APPENDIX E 
NON-TAP TEACHER ONLINE SURVEY QUESTIONS 
 
My name is Jimmy Gouard and I am working on my doctoral degree at Texas A&M 
University. The topic of my research is: Teachers’ perceptions of performance pay. I 
would like to better understand your personal beliefs, perceptions, and attitudes about 
performance-based compensation for teachers. 
  
The following survey is strictly voluntary and I would appreciate your candid input. The 
results of the survey will be confidential and will not include any names of people 
completing the survey.  
 
II. Demographic Information 
 
1. Gender 
Female  Male 
 
2. Indicate your current level of experience as an educator: 
0-5 years  6-10 years  11-15 years  16-20 years  21-25 years  26 or 
more 
 
3. Indicate your category as an educator: 
Term Contract Teacher  Probationary Contract Teacher    
 
4. Indicate your work assignment: 
 Elementary School  Middle School High School 
 
5. Indicate your current position: 
STAAR tested subject   Special Education Teacher  Elective Teacher 
 
II.  Perceptions and attitudes toward about performance pay programs 
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about 
performance based compensation plans. Please check one of the following responses that 
best fists your beliefs. 
 
Strongly Agree (SA) Agree (A) Neutral (N) Disagree (D) Strongly Disagree (SD) 
 
6. The current TAP incentive pay structure is an adequate way to pay educators. 
Strongly Agree (SA) Agree (A) Neutral (N) Disagree (D) Strongly Disagree (SD) 
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7. I believe that performance pay should be    (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
• based on student test scores.     (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD)  
• based on performance of students in my classroom. (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
(individual growth, portfolios, targeted growth, other)   
• based on building-wide performance criteria.  (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
8. Performance pay is the best option to increase teacher wages. 
 (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
9. Performance pay is a fair way to reward teacher performance. 
 (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
10. Performance pay will affect the retention of highly qualified teachers. 
 (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
11. The principle of relating teachers’ pay to performance is a good one. 
 (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
12. The idea of performance pay for teachers is fundamentally unfair. 
 (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
13. Experience on the job should count more towards determining pay levels. 
 (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
14. Performance-based pay:      
leads to greater motivation amongst teachers.  (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
has a positive effect on teacher recruitment.   (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
has a positive effect on teacher retention.   (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
reinforces good performance.    (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD)) 
would result in better and more effective teaching.  (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
would improve the quality of my work.   (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
would increase the quantity of my work.   (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
would make me work harder.    (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
would make me work longer hours.    (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
causes resentment among staff.    (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
15. Performance pay will be problematic because it is hard to link the work done in 
schools to individual performance. 
 (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
16. Performance pay will have no effect on the quality of my work because it is already 
at the appropriate standard. 
 (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
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17. Performance pay would make the staff less willing to assist colleagues. 
 (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
18. Performance pay would undermine staff morale. 
 (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
19. Performance pay would discourage teamwork and cooperation between teachers. 
 (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
20. Performance pay would motivate me to improve my teaching skills. 
 (SA) (A) (N) (D) (SD) 
 
You have reached the end of the survey. Thank you for your participation! 
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APPENDIX F 
PERMISSION REQUEST TO USE SURVEY QUESTIONS 
 
From: Matthew Springer mgspringer@gmail.com 
Sent: Wed 12/3/2014 1:17 PM 
 
Jimmy, 
 
Sure thing. Go for it.  
 
Best wishes, Matt 
 
From: Jimmy Gouard [mailto:jgouard@lytleisd.com]  
Sent: Tuesday, December 02, 2014 2:18 PM 
To: matthew.g.springer@vanderbilt.edu 
Subject: Request permission 
 
Dr. Springer,  
 
My name is Jimmy Gouard and I am currently a doctoral student at Texas A&M University 
and have Dr. Lori Taylor on my committee. She had suggested that I use survey 
instruments that have already been validated. I am referencing your work in my research 
and am working on a proposal to research the performance pay components of the TAP 
program in Texas within the TIF grant. I wanted to ask permission to use some of the 
survey questions for teachers and staff from the Texas studies you and your colleagues 
used in evaluating the DATE, TEEG and GEEG grants. Is there any particular process or 
form I need to fill out in order to request permission? Any assistance you could provide 
would be appreciated. Thank you.  
 
 
Jimmy Gouard 
Assistant Superintendent 
Lytle ISD 
830-709-5100 Ex. 4008 
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APPENDIX G 
PERMISSION REQUEST TO USE SURVEY QUESTIONS 
 
From: Forand, Sandra [mailto:Sandra.Forand@ride.ri.gov] 
Sent: Monday, February 09, 2015 6:45 AM 
To: Jimmy Gouard 
Subject: RE: permission to use survey questions 
 
Good Morning, 
 
You’re welcome to use whatever you need. Good luck on your dissertation. Please feel 
free reach out if you have any questions. 
 
Regards, 
Sandy 
 
From: Jimmy Gouard [mailto:jgouard@lytleisd.com]  
Sent: Sunday, February 08, 2015 12:09 PM 
To: Forand, Sandra 
Subject: permission to use survey questions 
 
Dr. Forand, 
 
My name is Jimmy Gouard and I am working on my doctoral proposal at Texas A&M 
University. I have a similar topic of teacher performance pay and teacher perceptions 
regarding the TAP program used in Texas. I was wondering if you would mind if I used 
you and your work for a reference and if I could adapt some of your survey questions to 
fit my specific topic of research. Thank you for your time. 
 
Jimmy Gouard 
Assistant Superintendent 
Lytle ISD 
830-709-5100 ext. 4008 
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APPENDIX H 
TEACHER FOCUS GROUP SCRIPT 
 
Hello. My name is Jimmy Gouard and I am conducting this focus group interview as part of my research 
for the doctoral program at Texas A&M University. The purpose of this focus group is to gather information 
on your attitudes and perceptions of the TAP program currently in use in your school district.  
 
Please answer the questions honestly, so that we can obtain accurate information about the TAP program 
at this school. This session will be recorded using audio only. Your responses will be completely confidential 
and reported in a way that does not identify you. Do you have any questions before we begin? 
_______________________________________________________________________
1. Let’s start by learning about the school’s involvement with TAP.   
When did implementation begin? What did you know about it, and how were you or 
other teachers involved in the decisions and processes? 
 
2. What do you feel are the main reasons that your school adopted TAP?  
 
3. What type of professional development and support have you received for 
implementing TAP?  Do you feel sufficiently prepared as result of the PD?  
 
4. Describe how the TAP performance pay components attempts to influence, and what 
its impacts have been for, each of the  following areas:  
a. Developing a positive school climate.  
b. Increasing teacher’s motivation and collegiality. 
d. Increasing students’ academic achievement.  
e. Increasing parent and community involvement.  
f. Making teaching more enjoyable and effective.  
 
5. What parts of TAP have been most successful, and why?  
 
6. What parts of TAP have been least successful, and why?  
 
7. How can TAP be made better for the future?  
 
8. What is your perception of the performance pay components of TAP?  
 
9. Would you support the TAP program being implemented in other schools?  
 
10. Is there anything else anyone would like to add before we conclude this interview? 
 
Thank you for time.   
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